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ABSTRACT
The last forty years have seen two major economic trends: wages
have stalled despite rising productivity, and institutional investors have
replaced retail shareholders as the predominant owners of the U.S.
equity markets. A few powerful institutional investors—dubbed
common owners—now hold large stakes in most U.S. corporations.
And in no coincidence, when U.S. workers acquired this new set of
bosses, their wages stopped growing while shareholder returns
increased. This Article explains how common owners shift wealth from
labor to capital, thereby exacerbating income inequality.
Powerful institutional investors pushing public corporations en
masse to adopt strong corporate governance has an inherent, painful
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tradeoff. While strong governance can improve corporate efficiency by
reducing management agency costs, it can also reduce social welfare by
limiting investment and thus hiring. Common owners act as a wage
cartel, pushing labor prices below their competitive level. Importantly,
common owners transfer wealth from workers to shareholders not by
actively pursuing anticompetitive measures but rather by allocating
more control to shareholders—control that can then be exercised by
other shareholders, such as hostile raiders and activist hedge funds. If
policymakers wish to restore the equilibrium that existed before
common ownership dominated the market, they should break up
institutional investors by limiting their size.
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INTRODUCTION
Workers in the United States are more productive than ever, but
they take home the same pay they did forty years ago.1 While firms
have enjoyed blockbuster profits2—and the gross domestic product
(“GDP”) has nearly tripled3—most U.S. households have not shared
in this increasing prosperity. As wages have stagnated, income
inequality has skyrocketed.4 Causes like de-unionization,5

1. See, e.g., Estimating the U.S. Labor Share, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. fig.1 (Feb. 2017),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/estimating-the-us-labor-share.htm [https://perma.cc/
DG5U-8DEY] (finding that the labor share of output has declined from 64 percent in 1982 to a
low of 56 percent in 2011); JOSH BIVENS, ELISE GOULD, LAWRENCE MISHEL & HEIDI
SHIERHOLZ, ECON. POL’Y INST., RAISING AMERICA’S PAY: WHY IT’S OUR CENTRAL
ECONOMIC POLICY CHALLENGE 10 fig.A (2014), https://files.epi.org/pdf/65287.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6QUR-4QF9] (finding that while productivity and compensation grew almost in tandem
from 1948 until 1979, thereafter between 1979 and 2013 productivity grew 64.9 percent while
hourly compensation grew only 8.2 percent).
2. See Robert Hughes, Corporate Profits Hit a New Record as GDP Growth Is Revised
Higher, AM. INST. FOR ECON. RSCH. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.aier.org/article/corporateprofits-hit-a-new-record-as-gdp-growth-is-revised-higher [https://perma.cc/KR37-5QJJ] (reporting
that in 2018, corporate profits after tax totaled a record-breaking $1968.5 billion); Nir Kaissar,
Opinion, The Hard Part of Ending Inequality Is Paying for It, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 2, 2019, 9:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-02/hard-part-of-ending-inequality-ispaying-for-it [https://perma.cc/K6XG-QT2C] (reporting that corporate profits as a percentage of
GDP hit the highest on record in 2012 and remained elevated, according to the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis); Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout & Gabriel Unger, The Rise of Market Power
and the Macroeconomic Implications, 135 Q.J. ECON. 561, 575 (2020) (“In 2016, the average
markup charged [was] 61% over marginal cost, compared with 21% in 1980.”).
3. GDP (Constant 2015 US$) - United States, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD?locations=US [https://perma.cc/SEM7-HNJ7].
4. See Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik & Rakesh Kochhar, Trends in Income and
Wealth Inequality, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/01/09/
trends-in-income-and-wealth-inequality [https://perma.cc/ND9Z-TPFP] (explaining that from
1970 to 2018, “the share held by upper-income households increased from 29% to 48%”).
5. See, e.g., LAWRENCE MISHEL, ECON. POL’Y INST., UNIONS, INEQUALITY, AND
FALTERING MIDDLE-CLASS WAGES 1 (2012), https://files.epi.org/2012/ib342-unions-inequality-
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globalization,6 immigration,7 labor market concentration,8 and
technology9 have been blamed for these trends. But so far, an
additional culprit has escaped detection: common owners—a few
powerful institutional investors controlling large stakes in most U.S.
corporations.10 As this Article explains, the rise of these powerful
shareholders has been a significant cause of wage stagnation and
income inequality.11 Indeed, institutional investors have done a good
job at avoiding blame, in large part due to their massive investments in
Environmental, Social, and Governance public relations campaigns
and lobbying efforts to avoid regulation.12 Unfortunately, the current
crisis-driven irregularities in the labor market further mask the four

middle-class-wages.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBK5-GEGF] (stating that a major factor behind
increased wage inequality is the erosion of unionization); Henry S. Farber, Daniel Herbst, Ilyana
Kuziemko & Suresh Naidu, Unions and Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence
from Survey Data, 136 Q.J. ECON. 1325, 1326 (2021) (finding “consistent evidence that unions
reduce inequality”).
6. See, e.g., Guido Cozzi & Giammario Impullitti, Globalization and Wage Polarization, 98
REV. ECON. & STAT. 984, 999 (2016) (“[G]lobalization . . . can be an important source of wage
polarization.”).
7. See, e.g., L. Jason Anastasopoulos, George J. Borjas, Gavin G. Cook & Michael
Lachanski, Job Vacancies and Immigration: Evidence from the Mariel Supply Shock, 15 J. HUM.
CAP. 1, 2 (2021) (“[T]he existing literature amply demonstrates the difficulty of measuring the
impact of immigration on wages.”).
8. See generally, e.g., José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market
Concentration, 57 J. HUM. RES. S167 (2022) [hereinafter Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration]
(finding geographic concentration in labor markets throughout the United States).
9. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US
Labor Markets, 128 J. POL. ECON. 2188, 2188 (2020) (finding that “[o]ne more robot per thousand
workers reduces the employment-to-population ratio by 0.2 percentage points and wages by
0.42%”); Clemens Lankisch, Klaus Prettner & Alexia Prskawetz, How Can Robots Affect Wage
Inequality?, 81 ECON. MODELLING 161, 161 (2019) (finding that “automation contributes towards
our understanding of the driving forces of rising inequality”).
10. See generally Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, Common
Ownership in America: 1980–2017, 13 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECON. 273 (2021) (documenting the
increase in common ownership).
11. This Article explains that the wage and inequality effects are driven by reduced
investments caused by common ownership, see infra Part II. A study has found that the aggregatelevel investment gap is mostly explained by low competition and high common ownership, see
Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Investmentless Growth: An Empirical Investigation,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Sept. 2017, at 89, 120 [hereinafter Gutiérrez &
Philippon, Investmentless Growth].
12. See generally Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s):
Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV.
1243, 1251 (2020) (arguing that “[i]n response to competition for money to manage, the largest
pools of assets in our economy have turned their power as shareholders to advancing investors’
social agenda”); infra notes 285–286 and accompanying text.
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decades of common owners’ anticompetitive effects on the labor
market.13
Since the 1980s, control of the U.S. stock markets has shifted from
individual retail investors to powerful financial institutions that own
shares in practically all public corporations.14 Today, these highly
diversified institutional investors own more than 70 percent of U.S.
publicly traded equity, up from less than 25 percent in the 1980s.15 The
three largest asset managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State
Street—collectively constitute the largest shareholder in nine out of ten
S&P 500 firms.16 The once-prevalent dispersed ownership structure17
has now been replaced by common ownership.18 Effectively, common
owners have hung an “Under New Management” sign over publicly
traded corporations. And, as a result, while these corporations
previously employed more than 40 percent of the U.S. workforce in
1973, after a steady decline, they only employed 29 percent in 2019,19
and wages stopped growing through the same period.
Powerful institutional shareholders move public corporations en
masse toward strong corporate governance, which provides
shareholders with greater control over managers and allows them to
13. See generally OECD, OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2021: NAVIGATING THE
COVID-19 CRISIS AND RECOVERY 15 (Andrea Bassanini ed., 2021) (explaining how “[t]he
burden of the COVID-19 crisis has fallen disproportionally on already vulnerable groups”).
14. See, e.g., Edward Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 363, 365–67 (Jeffrey N. Gordon
& Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (describing the “‘de-retailization’ of the capital markets” as a
result of labor regulations and market forces).
15. José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common
Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1514 (2018) [hereinafter Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects]; Germán
Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Investment-less Growth: An Empirical Investigation 15 fig.9 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22897, 2016) [hereinafter Gutiérrez & Philippon,
Investment-less Growth (Working Paper Version)], https://www.nber.org/papers/w22897 [https://
perma.cc/BJ6Y-G55S].
16. Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big
Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk,
19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017).
17. A dispersed ownership structure of a publicly traded corporation means that there is no
individual shareholder with sufficient voting power and an incentive to exercise control over
management. See John C. Coffee Jr., Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, the Evidence, and the
Enduring Tension Between “Lumpers” and “Splitters,” in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CAPITALISM 463, 463–64 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 2012).
18. See Backus et al., supra note 10, at 285 fig.4 (showing the rise in share ownership by
common owners).
19. Frederik P. Schlingemann & René M. Stulz, Have Exchange-Listed Firms Become Less
Important for the Economy?, 143 J. FIN. ECON. 927, 928 (2022).

GOSHEN AND LEVIT PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

6

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/21/2022 1:26 PM

[Vol. 72:1

fire managers easily.20 The conventional wisdom praises institutional
investors for strengthening corporate governance because it improves
corporate efficiency by deterring disloyal managers from overinvesting
and wasting resources on pet projects.21 But, at the same time, strong
governance also discourages loyal managers from investing in valueincreasing projects. Managers who are more exposed to shareholder
intervention are less likely to pursue bold, long-term, or transformative
investments.22 Such investments are hard to evaluate and might be
misperceived by shareholders as inefficient investments, increasing
managers’ risk of being mistakenly fired.23 Instead, managers increase
payouts to shareholders through dividends and share buybacks.24
Therefore, both loyal and disloyal managers are likely to decrease
investing under a strong-governance regime.25

20. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2104 (2019) (documenting
that the Big Three institutional investors “have been very active in supporting [shareholders’]
proposals advocating governance changes favored by their governance principles”); Asaf
Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of Corporate Compliance, 105 IOWA L.
REV. 507, 507–08 (2020) (showing the benefits of common ownership in improving compliance).
21. See generally Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance,
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (introducing the problem of management
overinvestment); Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance
and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217 (1989) (offering evidence in support of the empire-building—
pursuing size for the sake of size rather than profitability—hypothesis); Scott Richardson, OverInvestment of Free Cash Flow, 11 REV. ACCT. STUD. 159 (2006) (finding that strong governance
reduces overinvestment); Micah S. Officer, Overinvestment, Corporate Governance, and Dividend
Initiations, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 710 (2011) (finding that reductions in overinvestment at firms with
poor investment opportunities are reflected in higher dividends).
22. See Zohar Goshen & Doron Levit, Irrelevance of Governance Structure 8 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 606/2019, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3340912
[https://perma.cc/HDQ7-9NXL] (modeling the choice facing managers between whether to invest
in pet projects or value-creating investment projects).
23. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 787, 803 (2017); Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani,
Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE. L.J. 560, 580–81 (2016).
24. A corporation can distribute accumulated profits to its shareholders either in the form
of dividends or buybacks. See generally, e.g., EDWARD YARDENI, JOE ABBOTT & MALI
QUINTANA, YARDENI RSCH., INC., CORPORATE FINANCE BRIEFING: S&P 500 BUYBACKS &
DIVIDENDS (2022), https://www.yardeni.com/pub/buybackdiv.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G3F-G459]
(detailing the dividends and buybacks of S&P 500 firms from 1999 to 2021).
25. It is debatable whether, between these two opposing effects—decreasing management
agency costs while discouraging value-creating investments—strong governance is, on average,
socially beneficial. The empirical findings are inconclusive. For a review of these studies, see
Goshen & Squire, supra note 23, at 814–25.
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As investment falls, so too will hiring, as companies no longer
require the labor force to operate new factories or staff new divisions.26
This hiring shortfall artificially depresses wages, allowing firms to enjoy
a wage discount and moving wealth from workers to shareholders. By
switching firms en masse to strong governance, institutional investors
reduce the total investment in the economy and the demand for labor.
In other words, they create the anticompetitive twin of a monopoly,
known as a monopsony. While a monopoly is a powerful seller that
reduces supply and raises prices of products, a monopsony is a powerful
buyer that reduces demand and lowers prices of resources (in this case,
labor).27 They create a labor market monopsony without resorting to
collusion,28 and indeed, likely without intending to create one.29
Common owners’ labor monopsony is driven by shareholders’ market
power over managers of numerous firms, each separately pursuing its
economic interest. This concentration of ownership results in lower

26. See Frederico Belo, Xiaoji Lin & Santiago Bazdresch, Labor Hiring, Investment, and
Stock Return Predictability in the Cross Section, 122 J. POL. ECON. 129, 131–32 (2014) (examining
the relationship between hiring and investment).
27. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISERS, LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY: TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES,
AND POLICY RESPONSES 2 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/
files/20161025_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZFZ9-826K] (“[A] firm with
monopsony power has the ability to pay lower prices for its inputs . . . .”). While monopolies use
market power to increase the price of goods they sell to consumers, monopsonies use market
power to decrease the price of goods they purchase from suppliers. See id. Although common
owners own multiple firms that collectively should be termed an oligopsony, this Article elects to
use the somewhat more palatable single-firm term monopsony as a matter of style. See
Oligopsony, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oligopsony
[https://perma.cc/BLP7-74CE] (defining “oligopsony” as “a market situation in which each of a
few buyers exerts a disproportionate influence on the market”).
28. While this Article’s thesis—that common owners create a monopsony—applies to all
inputs, such as materials and equipment, we focus on labor for two reasons. First, when the inputs
in question are goods and services rather than labor, common owners benefit less from
monopsony pricing. Because they likely also own stakes in the suppliers, their gains via the buyer
firms are offset by losses in the seller firms. However, when the resource in question is labor,
common owners capture economic value that otherwise would be reflected in wages and salaries,
in which they have no stake. Second, workers tend to have less discretion to withhold their
services from the market, as they need to earn a living. Thus, workers wield less bargaining power
than providers of goods and services. See Orley Ashenfelter, Kirk Doran & Bruce Schaller, A
Shred of Credible Evidence on the Long-Run Elasticity of Labor Supply, 77 ECONOMICA 637, 637
(2010) (noting the “relatively broad consensus that the long-run elasticity of labour supply is not
likely to be large”).
29. As explained infra in Part III.D, pushing firms toward stronger governance manifests
itself in higher profits, making common owners believe they are reducing agency costs.
Unfortunately, the true effect of high profitability is driven by the depressed wages.

GOSHEN AND LEVIT PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

8

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/21/2022 1:26 PM

[Vol. 72:1

demand, and consequently a lower equilibrium price, for labor, causing
wages to stagnate rather than rise with productivity increases.30
Using the empirical finding that two-thirds of the decrease in
investment is attributable to common ownership and corporate
governance,31 this Article presents a novel economic model that
exposes the mechanism by which common ownership and corporate
governance reduce investment, thereby leading to stagnant wages.
Indeed, just recently, two empirical studies confirmed that an increase
in institutional investors’ shareholding reduces wages and employment,
thereby providing the “last mile” evidence supporting our model. In
the first study (April 2021), the authors found that “firms that
experience an increase in ownership by larger and more concentrated
institutional shareholders have lower employment and wages.”32 In the
second study (November 2021), Professor José Azar and his co-authors
found that “an increase in common ownership in a labor market is
associated with decreases in both wages per employee and the
employment-to-population ratio.”33
In a competitive market, shareholders will respond to abnormally
low wages by switching to weak governance in order to free managers
to invest and take advantage of discounted labor prices.34 As more
firms switch to weak governance and increase their investments,
increased hiring will push wages up, decreasing the profitability of
investments until it is no longer worthwhile to switch to weak
governance. A symmetric process of firms switching to strong
governance kicks in to discourage investments when wages are
abnormally high. Wages and governance structure thus form a
feedback loop, resulting in a competitive equilibrium where a certain
number of strong- and weak-governance corporations coexist and are
equally profitable—and, importantly, where wages are determined
competitively.35

30. See infra Part III.E.1.
31. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investmentless Growth, supra note 11, at 89.
32. Antonio Falato, Hyunseob Kim & Till M. von Wachter, Shareholder Power and the
Decline of Labor 0 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 30203, 2022), https://
www.nber.org/papers/w30203 [https://perma.cc/RJ8W-FUP7].
33. José Azar, Yue Qiu & Aaron Sojourner, Common Ownership Reduces Wages and
Employment, FOX SCH. BUS. 0 (Nov. 1, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3954399 [https://per
ma.cc/67PX-HSGD].
34. See infra Part III.B.
35. See infra Part III.C.
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Common owners break this feedback loop. Unlike in the
competitive equilibrium, common owners push firms toward strong
governance regardless of prevailing labor prices. More firms with
strong governance leads to lower investment, reduced demand for
labor, and decreased wages.36 The remaining investments of weak- and
strong-governance firms see increased profits due to the labor
discount. And because common owners hold the entire portfolio of
strong- and weak-governance firms, their portfolio values go up. By
preventing firms from switching to weak governance, common owners
disable the market mechanism—the choice of governance structure—
that drives wages back up when they are below their competitive rate.
As a result, our model predicts wages will be persistently low under
common ownership without the need for collusion among firms.37 And
because the labor monopsony means greater profits for (typically
wealthier) shareholders and lower wages for (typically less wealthy)
employees, it exacerbates income inequality.38
Importantly, this Article shows that common owners exert labormonopsony power not by exercising control over management
decisions (as existing literature argues39) but rather by allocating
control to shareholders (pushing toward strong governance40), which
can then be exercised by other shareholders such as activist hedge
funds41 or hostile raiders.42 That is, institutional investors do not need
to engage in any illegal anticompetitive conspiracy—such as
coordinating production cutbacks across firms43—to enjoy a labor

36. See infra Part III.D.
37. In our model, common owners increase shareholder profits at the expense of other
stakeholders not through illegal coordination in the pricing of products (output) as suggested by
other theories, but rather through strong governance resulting in monopsony pricing of labor
(input). For discussion of the other theories, see infra Part III.E.
38. See, e.g., Joshua Gans, Andrew Leigh, Martin Schmalz & Adam Triggs, Inequality and
Market Concentration, When Shareholding Is More Skewed Than Consumption, 35 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 550, 550 (2019) (finding that in 2016, “the top 20 percent consumed approximately
as much as the bottom 60 percent, but had 15 times as much corporate equity” and that “[b]ecause
ownership is more skewed than consumption, increased mark-ups increase inequality”).
39. For a description and analysis of these studies, see generally C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel
Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common Ownership, 129 YALE L.J. 1392 (2020).
40. See infra Part I.B.
41. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013).
42. See infra Part I.B.1.
43. When organizing a cartel, each corporation affects the other corporations, requiring the
cartel to allocate quotas and monitor against defections. See generally Joseph E. Harrington &
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discount. Rather, they only need to strive to maximize the value of
their shares in each corporation. Thus, the common ownership
monopsony theory does not share the same drawbacks as other
theories alleging anticompetitive effects of common ownership.44
Indeed, scholars have heralded institutional investors as guardians
of shareholder rights whose ability to monitor corporations and hold
disloyal managers accountable creates a net social benefit, a portion of
which accrues to employees through their retirement plans.45 However,
this Article shows that in exchange for this marginal increase in the
value of their pension’s stock portfolio, employees are resigning
themselves to depressed hiring and stagnant wages, even as their
productivity—and consequently their value to the corporations—
surges to record levels.
Acknowledging the inherent tradeoff of strong governance—
reducing management agency costs while creating a labor
monopsony—presents a dilemma for policymakers. Should they side
with employees or shareholders? If shareholders’ interests are the
concern, nothing should be done. The power of common owners will
continue to grow, and with it, the effects of strong governance.46 If the
interests of employees are the concern, however, then policymakers
should act. To return markets to their previous competitive
equilibrium, where labor and capital efficiently and equitably shared
corporate value, they must eliminate common owners’ monopsony
effect.

Andrzej Skrzypacz, Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent
Collusive Practices, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2425 (2011).
44. See infra Part III.E.
45. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1644 (2013) (arguing that “shareholder ability to intervene . . . provides
long-term benefits to companies, shareholders, and the economy”); Bernard S. Black, Agents
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 815 (1992)
(“[I]nstitutions are the only watchers available.”); Audra L. Boone & Joshua T. White, The Effect
of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production, 117 J. FIN. ECON.
508, 508 (2015) (finding that institutional investors “facilitate[] information production, which
enhances monitoring”); Alan D. Crane, Sébastien Michenaud & James P. Weston, The Effect of
Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: Evidence from Index Thresholds, 29 REV. FIN. STUD.
1377, 1377 (2016) (finding that “even nonactivist institutions play an important role in monitoring
firm behavior,” leading to increased dividends).
46. Mergers in the asset management industry are expected to increase concentration. See,
e.g., Leslie P. Norton, Trian’s Nelson Peltz Wants To Fix the Fund Industry, BARRON’S, Oct. 5,
2020, at 16.
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To achieve this goal in the absence of collusive activity that can be
directly policed, this Article suggests breaking up the large institutional
investors by limiting their size. Several institutional investors have
assets under management (“AUM”) in the trillions of dollars.47
Limiting institutional investors to holding no more than a half-trillion
dollars in AUM would increase the number of institutional investors,
encourage competition in the market, and readjust the balance of
power between managers and shareholders. These shifts would
reignite corporate managers’ incentives to increase corporate
investment and labor demand, restoring the labor market’s
competitive equilibrium and leading to higher wages and greater
income equality. Indeed, institutional investors have engaged in a
massive “capture” of Congress through political spending,48 making a
breakup hard to achieve. However, with the Biden administration’s
commitment to extending antitrust policy to “promote the interests of
American workers,”49 including breaking up big tech behemoths,50 and
both parties’ attention shifting to the hitherto neglected middle class,
one can still hope that Congress can find common cause in arresting
the decline of the American worker by breaking up common owners.51
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the rise of
common ownership and the shift toward strong governance. Part II
presents the empirical evidence that the shift to strong governance has
decreased investment and caused wages to stagnate. Part III sets out
an economic model that explains the link between governance
structure and wages and shows how common owners break the
governance equilibrium by altering the balance of strong- and weakgovernance companies. Part IV outlines the policy implications of the
monopsony effect. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes key takeaways.

47. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
48. See infra Part IV.
49. Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 14, 2021).
50. Zephyr Teachout, A Blueprint for a Trust-Busting Biden Presidency, NEW REPUBLIC
(Dec. 18, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/160646/bidenantitrust-blueprint-monopolybusting [https://perma.cc/5VA4-DHX3].
51. See, e.g., Susan Davis, Top Republicans Work To Rebrand GOP as Party of Working
Class, NPR (Apr. 13, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/13/986549868/top-republicanswork-to-rebrand-gop-as-party-of-working-class [https://perma.cc/AV79-8YEE] (“The battle for
the working class is even more urgent for the two parties because it’s a growing bloc of voters.”).

GOSHEN AND LEVIT PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/21/2022 1:26 PM

[Vol. 72:1

I. THE RISE OF COMMON OWNERSHIP
The move from dispersed ownership to common ownership
dramatically changed how corporations are owned and run. Retail
shareholders—everyday folks holding stock in pensions or investment
accounts—could not meaningfully monitor corporate conduct.52 By
contrast, large asset managers such as BlackRock and State Street have
the power and sophistication to influence their portfolio companies.53
Common owners have used this newfound influence to usher in a new
era of strong governance, pushing for measures that empower
shareholders over managers.54 As this Article will show, the shift from
weak to strong governance, precipitated by the rise of common
ownership, has had far-reaching consequences.
Part I.A describes how common owners unseated retail investors
as the dominant force in the U.S. equity markets. Part I.B shows how
common owners have used this influence to institute stronggovernance measures that make directors and officers responsive to
shareholders’ desires.
A. From Dispersed to Common Ownership
Sixty years ago, the equity markets were dominated by dispersed
shareholders and managers who ran corporations more or less exactly
how they saw fit.55 The three largest institutional investors—
BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, the so-called “Big Three”—
did not yet exist.56 Today, their collective AUM exceeds the GDP of
52. See Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 303, 303 (2008) (defining retail investors as “individual investors who, compared to
institutional investors or wealthy individual investors, have modest portfolios, a lesser degree of
investment acumen and less individualized attention from professional advisors”).
53. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
54. See infra Part I.B.
55. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932); see also Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 10–11 (1991) (coining the term “Berle-Means corporation” and
defining it as one with “fragmented shareholders buying and selling on the stock exchange”).
56. See Vanguard at a Glance: Facts and Figures, VANGUARD, https://corporate.vang
uard.com/content/corporatesite/us/en/corp/who-we-are/sets-us-apart/facts-and-figures.html
[https://perma.cc/H4DL-UUAZ] (noting that Vanguard was founded in 1975); History,
BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/blackrock-history [https://perma.cc
/9UZ7-DYXD] (noting that BlackRock was founded in 1988); Our History, STATE STREET
GLOBAL ADVISORS, https://www.ssga.com/us/en/individual/etfs/about-us/our-history [https://per
ma.cc/RK2F-XWF4] (noting that State Street Global Advisors, the asset management arm of
State Street, was founded in 1978).
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China.57 This transformation of U.S. equity markets precipitated the
labor monopsony effect that is the subject of this Article.
A few figures regarding institutional investors—mutual funds,
pension funds, and insurance companies—help put the magnitude of
this change into perspective. The dominant aspect of all investment
strategies used by institutional investors is reducing risk through
diversification—buying shares in many corporations.58 The most
common diversification is buying all of the shares of an index (such as
the S&P 500 or the Russell 2000). In 1965, institutional investors
collectively held a relatively small fraction of the stock market—about
14 percent.59 Then, as described by Professors Ronald Gilson and
Jeffrey Gordon,60 shifts in employee retirement savings regulation
toward privatization and investment of pension funds created a huge
source of funds under institutional investors’ control.61 Consequently,
by 1980, institutional investors controlled about 25 percent of the stock

57. BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard have a combined AUM of more than $20
trillion. See infra note 64. The gross domestic product of China as of 2020 was $14.7 trillion. GDP
(Current US$), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_
recent_value_desc=true [https://perma.cc/REE6-3XTN].
58. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 41, at 884–85.
59. See BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 1965–1974, at 95 tbl.L.213 (2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/z1/20140306/annuals/a1965-1974.pdf [https://perma.cc/6V7U-QPQK] (showing that the
entire equity market of all U.S. public shares was worth less than $750 billion at the time). Shares
of U.S. corporations not held by institutional investors were held directly by the public or by large
shareholders, including controlling shareholders. See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain
of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 848
(1999) (discussing ownership patterns of U.S. corporations and noting the presence of controlling
shareholders in an appreciable segment of the economy).
60. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 41, at 878–79.
61. Specifically, three regulatory choices were the main cause: the reliance on privately
funded pensions (instead of Social Security), “the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income
and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),” and later, the shift from defined-benefit to definedcontribution pension plans by employers. See id. First, “substantial tax incentives encouraged
workers and employers to look to private plans” rather than Social Security. See id. at 879. Next,
ERISA mandated that companies must hold pension funds in fully funded special entities with
fiduciary duties to the employees; public pension funds followed suit, and pension-fund assets
increased more than threefold to $3 trillion between 1980 and 1990. See id. at 879–80. Finally, the
shift to defined contribution (specified contributions to retirement accounts in the employee’s
control) accelerated demands for the services of institutional investors. See id. at 880–81.
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market, with pension funds alone holding 17.4 percent.62 And by 2015,
institutional investors collectively held over 50 percent of the market.63
Importantly, this shift toward privatization created a concentrated
class of shareholders that is both highly diversified and dominant. First,
institutional investors are concentrated insofar as a few firms wield
especially significant influence.64 Overall, the largest twenty-five
institutional investors hold more than 30 percent of all U.S. corporate
shares,65 and the largest ten hold the vast majority of those assets.66
Second, they are diversified insofar as their holdings essentially span
the global equity markets.67 The largest asset managers have between
80 percent and 97 percent of their equity invested in index funds,68
encompassing mid- and small-cap companies as well as large ones. For
instance, BlackRock has a 5 percent or greater stake in more than 2000

62. James M. Poterba & Andrew A. Samwick, Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock Market
Fluctuations, and Consumption, 1995 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 295, 313 tbl.5
(describing the changing pattern of stock ownership during the previous three decades).
63. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investment-less Growth (Working Paper Version), supra note
15.
64. See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds
Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 55 (2013) (stating that three specific mutual
funds dominate other mutual funds in terms of the size of AUM). For example, in the commercial
sector, BlackRock holds approximately $8.68 trillion in AUM, Vanguard holds $8.1 trillion,
Fidelity holds $4.28 trillion, and State Street holds $4.02 trillion. About BlackRock, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/sg/en/about-us [https://perma.cc/W9L5-QN6V] (reporting total as of
Dec. 20, 2020); Vanguard at a Glance: Facts and Figures, VANGUARD, https://corporate.van
guard.com/content/corporatesite/us/en/corp/who-we-are/sets-us-apart/facts-and-figures.html
[https://perma.cc/H4DL-UUAZ] (reporting total as of Mar. 31, 2022); Fidelity by the Numbers:
Asset Management, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/our-company/asset-mana
gement [https://perma.cc/2JLP-CGMA] (reporting total as of Mar. 31, 2022); Who We Are, STATE
ST. GLOBAL ADVISORS, https://www.ssga.com/us/en/individual/mf/about-us/who-we-are [https://
perma.cc/YES4-AUKB] (reporting total as of Mar. 31, 2022).
65. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Anti-Activist Poison Pills, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 915, 939–
40 (2019).
66. As of December 2016. Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni, Rabih Moussawi & John
Sedunov, The Granular Nature of Large Institutional Investors 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 22247, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22247 [https://perma.cc/233KXQKV].
67. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 41, at 884–85; see also Einer Elhauge, Horizontal
Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016) [hereinafter Elhauge, Horizontal
Shareholding] (describing “horizontal shareholding,” where large financial institutions hold
significant shares in competing corporations, as pervasive).
68. See Fichtner et al., supra note 16, at 304. For example, funds that track the S&P 500 hold
five hundred of the largest publicly traded U.S. corporations representing some 80 percent of
available market capitalization. See S&P 500, S&P DOW JONES INDICES, https://us.spindices.com/
indices/equity/sp-500 [https://perma.cc/B6HG-CWFZ].
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of the 3900 publicly traded U.S. corporations.69 Third, they are
dominant insofar as they hold large stakes in most publicly traded
corporations.70 Institutional shareholders own, on average, over 70
percent of the stock in the one thousand biggest firms.71 The Big Three,
when considered together, are the “single” largest shareholder in
almost half of all publicly listed U.S. companies (1662 out of
approximately 3900 firms) and most of the S&P 500 (438 out of 500
firms).72
The dominance of these horizontal shareholders has resulted in
increasing overlap in the ownership of all major U.S. corporations. For
instance, in 1999, the odds that two public companies in the same
industry shared a 5 percent owner were one in five. By 2014, that figure
was nine out of ten—that is, 90 percent of public companies shared an
owner that held at least 5 percent of each company.73 The portfolios of
common owners encompass entire industries; for example, horizontal
shareholding is prevalent in the airline, banking, technology, and
pharmacy sectors.74
Importantly, although the terms “horizontal shareholders”75 and
“common ownership” are relatively new, the phenomenon dates back
to the advent of institutional ownership: any highly diversified
shareholder holds shares of competing corporations and is practically

69. Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance
Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 803, 811 (2018).
70. See id.; Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech: Institutional
Investors: Powers and Responsibility (Apr. 19, 2013) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2013-spch041913laahtm [https://perma.cc/2NG3-2G7C]) (“Simply stated, institutional
investors are dominant market players . . . .”).
71. See MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, CONF. BD., THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 27
tbl.13, http://shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20101111_ConferenceBoard.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/QB5Y-MCYL] (showing that in 2009, ownership concentration of institutional investors in
the top one thousand U.S. corporations by market value was 73 percent).
72. Fichtner et al., supra note 16.
73. See José Azar, Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, and the Theory of the Firm 2
(IESE Bus. Sch. Univ. of Nevarra, Working Paper No. 1170-E, 2017), https://media.iese.edu/
research/pdfs/WP-1170-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/5D5X-Y6JQ]. One study found that the level of
overlap in stock ownership grew by more than fifteen times between 1980 and 2012. See Erik P.
Gilje, Todd A. Gormley & Doron Levit, The Rise of Common Ownership 19 (Apr. 19, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), http://gcgc.global/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/6.-Levit_The_Rise_of_
Common_Ownership_June_6_2017P-1.pdf [https:/perma.cc/RR5K-LENN].
74. See Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 67, at 1267–68.
75. Id. at 1268.
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a common owner.76 But only when institutional investors grew in power
was the term “common owners” coined by scholars concerned with
their anticompetitive consequences on product markets.77 This Article
thus uses the terms common owners and institutional investors
interchangeably.
B. The Push for Strong Governance
While corporate law scholars have described institutional
investors as “rationally reticent” to actively govern their portfolio
companies,78 common owners themselves sing a different tune. For
example, William McNabb, Vanguard’s chief executive, commented in
a letter to Vanguard’s portfolio corporations, “[S]ome have mistakenly
assumed that our predominantly passive management style suggests a
passive attitude with respect to corporate governance. Nothing could
be further from the truth.” McNabb further clarified, “We have no
interest in telling companies how to run their businesses, but we have
valuable governance insights to share with the board of directors.”79
McNabb’s letter illustrates how, over the past four decades, common
owners have reshaped the corporate governance paradigm by pushing
for strong-governance measures that give shareholders substantial
control over corporate managers.80
Even the most “passive” of investors—index funds that mimic
market portfolios such as the S&P 500—actively agitate for strong
governance. Of course, index funds cannot express dissent by selling,
as the essence of an index fund is the commitment to its clients to hold
the shares of the corporations included in the given index to mimic the

76. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 41, at 884–86 (describing diversification as institutional
investors’ dominant investment strategy).
77. See generally Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 15, who were among the
first to use this term.
78. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 41, at 895.
79. Letter from F. William McNabb III, Chairman & CEO, Vanguard, to Bds. Dirs.
Vanguard Funds Largest Portfolio Holdings 1 (Feb. 27, 2015), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/7-CEO_Letter_03_02_ext.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WKQ-8Y6R].
80. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
263, 277–82 (2019) (explaining how institutional investors have pushed for strong governance and
shareholder empowerment, obviating to a large degree the need for courts to protect
shareholders’ rights); Barry B. Burr, Money Managers Increasing Activism on Governance—But
Quietly, PENSIONS & INVS. (Mar. 19, 2012), https://www.pionline.com/article/20120319/PRINT/
303199980/money-managers-increasing-activism-on-governance-but-quietly [https://perma.cc/K8
ED-LAVR].
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index’s performance. However, they can—and do—vote. And they
vote disproportionately in favor of measures that empower
shareholders81 and mostly as part of one-size-fits-all voting policies.82
On the other hand, active funds, unconstrained in their trading, use the
threat of exit—that is, selling—to influence corporate governance.83
Additionally, asset managers engage both formally and informally with
their portfolio companies by discussing strategy and governance with
management.84
The most prominent outcome of these activities has been the push
for strong governance.85 While the particular policies promoted by
institutional investors have changed over the decades, they share the
goal of increasing shareholders’ influence over their portfolio
companies.
1. The 1980s: The Age of Hostile Takeovers. Before 1980,
managers of public corporations were loyal to the corporation, not the
shareholder, and governance mechanisms were hardly used.86 Hostile
takeovers were relatively few, and proxy fights were uncommon, with

81. See Ian R. Appel, Todd. A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Passive Investors, Not Passive
Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 113–14 (2016) [hereinafter Appel et al., Passive Investors].
82. See generally, e.g., BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: PROXY
VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES (2022), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/
literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/94V6-BUQX]
(describing general BlackRock voting policies); VANGUARD, VANGUARD FUNDS: PROXY
VOTING POLICY FOR U.S. PORTFOLIO COMPANIES (2021), https://corporate.vanguard.com/
content/dam/corp/advocate/investment-stewardship/pdf/policies-and-reports/
2021_proxy_voting_policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/6F85-GH6Q] (describing general Vanguard
voting policies); Rick Lacaille & Rakhi Kumar, 2019 Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines:
North America, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 27, 2019), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/27/2019-proxy-voting-and-engagement-guidelines-north-america
[https://perma.cc/8K43-GYPF] (outlining general proxy voting principles).
83. See, e.g., Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes:
The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2912 & tbl.II
(2016) (documenting institutional investors use of exit, the threat of exit, and “behind the scenes”
discussions with boards and management to achieve governance goals).
84. See id. at 2912 (finding “widespread use of private discussions [with portfolio firms]
support[ing] the view that investors try to engage firms behind the scenes through direct
negotiations”).
85. See Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap Between Ownership and Control, 34 J. CORP.
L. 409, 425 (2009) (“[I]nstitutional investors tend to acquire a significant portion of stock in a
corporation to gain a measure of control in the corporation.”).
86. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in
the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSPS. 121, 123 (2001)
[hereinafter Holmstrom & Kaplan, Merger Activity].
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little chance of success.87 Boards were mainly composed of insiders
supporting management. Long-term performance plans were
expansively employed and referenced accounting measures instead of
stock market prices, tying managerial incentives only indirectly to
shareholder value.88 Accordingly, management ownership of equity
was modest; in 1980, only 30 percent of chief executive officers’
(“CEOs’”) compensation was tied to stock market performance.89
By 1980, institutional investors crossed the 25 percent ownership
mark,90 reaching a size that allowed them to end the era of managerial
freedom by unleashing a wave of hostile takeovers.91 Notably, hostile
takeovers are a powerful external strong-governance mechanism that
can hold inefficient managers accountable by replacing them upon a
successful acquisition of corporate control.92 Hostile takeovers are a
profit-making opportunity for institutional investors. When a manager
underperforms, the corporation’s share price decreases, making the
corporation an attractive target for a hostile bidder who will buy the
corporation for the depressed price plus premium. Institutional
investors will benefit by getting the premium and the deterrence effect
on other underperforming managers in their portfolio. The bidder will
change management to improve performance and enjoy the increase
in price that will result from the improved performance.93
The takeover activity that started “to accelerate in the early 1980s
and boomed throughout much of the decade”94 was fueled by the rise
of institutional investors in two ways. First, because institutional
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 653, 663 (1998) (“[B]oth the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of
compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely because of
increases in stock option grants.”).
90. Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q.J.
ECON. 229, 233, 236 (2001) (finding that institutional investors controlled 26.8 percent of the
market value of all publicly traded stocks in early 1980).
91. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance:
What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 11 (2003) (“It was the potential for
improved corporate performance, combined with the increased ownership of institutional
investors, that gave birth to the takeovers, junk bonds, and [leveraged buyouts] of the 1980s.”).
92. See Henry G. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares—A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967
DUKE L.J. 231, 236–37 (arguing that the threat of raiders encourages managers to manage their
companies as efficiently as possible).
93. Id. at 236.
94. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, Merger Activity, supra note 86.
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investors were more interested in extracting high returns and less loyal
to incumbent management than individual investors, they were the
main sellers of large blocks of shares in takeovers.95 Second,
institutional investors were also the takeovers’ main financiers,
investing large amounts in buyout funds and the market for high-yield
bonds.96 Indeed, Nobel Laureate Bengt Holmstrom and Professor
Steven Kaplan explained that without a large increase in institutional
investors’ funds, it is unlikely that there would have been a willingness
and ability to support multibillion dollar takeovers.97
Unleashing takeovers was just the beginning. More importantly,
the rise of institutional investors shifted the power from stakeholders
to shareholders, giving rise to what is known as shareholder primacy.98
This shift became the norm in corporate America—even after the
takeover wave subsided in the 1990s99—leading to increased
shareholder power and stronger governance.
2. The 1990s: The Age of Independent Boards. Institutional
investors kept growing in power, crossing the 40 percent ownership
mark in 1990 and surpassing the 50 percent majority ownership mark
by the end of the decade.100 While in the 1980s, institutional investors
activated an external governance mechanism—hostile takeovers—in
the 1990s, they cemented the shift to shareholder primacy through
internal governance mechanisms—independent boards101 and equity

95. Id. at 132.
96. Id. Most of the financing for takeovers came in the form of high-risk, high-yield bonds,
also known as “junk bonds,” most famously issued by Michael Milken through the investment
bank Drexel Burnham Lambert. See Elijah Brewer III & William E. Jackson III, Requiem for a
Market Maker: The Case of Drexel Burnham Lambert and Junk Bonds, 17 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH.
209, 209–10, 232 n.9 (2000).
97. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, Merger Activity, supra note 86, at 132.
98. Shareholder primacy is a form of corporate governance that prioritizes the interests of
shareholders over all other corporate stakeholders. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41, 443 (2001).
99. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, Merger Activity, supra note 86, at 132.
100. Gompers & Metrick, supra note 90, at 237 fig.I.
101. Independent boards are comprised of directors that do not have a material stake in the
company and, consequently, are less subjected to influence by managers of a corporation. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1526 (2007) (detailing the rise
of independent boards).
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compensation.102 Both mechanisms were aimed at aligning
management incentives with shareholders’ interests and stock market
prices.
As thoroughly detailed by Professor Jeffrey Gordon, in the 1990s,
public companies’ boards became markedly more independent and
active monitors than in the past.103 While in 1980 independent directors
comprised on average 31 percent of boards, in 1990 they became the
majority, holding 60 percent of the seats and 69 percent in 2000.104 This
trend continued, eventually reaching a supermajority of independent
directors. In 2016, for instance, in most corporations on the S&P 500,
independent directors held more than 70 percent of the seats.105 As
independent directors are more inclined to hold managers accountable
to shareholders,106 this shift led to a marked increase in turnovers and
more hiring of new CEOs from outside the company.107 In the largest
five hundred U.S. firms, internal turnovers went up from an annual rate
of 12.62 percent in 1992 to 19.15 percent in 2000, shortening the
average tenure from about eight years to about five years.108 And
around half of all CEO turnovers were performance-induced.109
Similarly, external hires as a percentage of all new CEO appointments

102. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX
POL’Y & ECON. 1, 1–2 (2000) [hereinafter Hall & Liebman, Taxation] (finding that the dramatic
explosion in stock options involves changes in the fraction of shares held by large institutional
investors, corporate governance, and the market for corporate control, rather than tax
considerations).
103. Gordon, supra note 101, at 1475 fig.2.
104. Id. at 1565 app. tbl.1.
105. Renee Lightner & Theo Francis, Inside America’s Boardrooms, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19,
2016, 1:30 PM), http://graphics.wsj.com/boards-of-directors-at-SP-500-companies [https://perma.cc/
WR4S-FYCF].
106. That attitude was bolstered by reducing the influence of management on directors’
appointments, Gordon, supra note 101, at 1496, and by increasing the amount of directors’ equitybased compensation, Holmstrom & Kaplan, Merger Activity, supra note 86, at 135.
107. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, Merger Activity, supra note 86, at 135.
108. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12
INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 61 (2012) (“In the earlier period from 1992 to 1996, total CEO turnover using
definition 1 is 12.62% per year implying an average tenure of 7.9 years. In the period from 1997
to 2002, total turnover increases to 19.15% per year, implying an average tenure of just 5.2
years.”).
109. Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, Executive Compensation: A Survey of
Theory and Evidence, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
383, 421 (Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017).
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increased from 15 percent in the 1970s to 27 percent during the 1990s
and 32 percent during the 2000s.110
Increased monitoring increases CEOs’ dismissal risk, and, at the
same time,111 CEOs’ compensation goes up.112 For example, an S&P
500 CEO’s average total compensation increased from about $2 million
in 1980 to more than $4 million in 1990, peaking above $18 million in
2000.113 And while in 1980 equity-based compensation was about 20
percent of total CEO compensation,114 in 1996 it surpassed 50 percent,
and in 2000 it peaked at 78 percent.115 These changes increased CEO
pay-to-performance sensitivities by a factor of ten times from 1980 to
1998,116 strongly aligning managements’ interests with those of
shareholders. Consequently, maximizing shareholder value became a
powerful guide to managerial behavior.
These changes of the 1990s were fueled by the growing ownership
of institutional investors and their activism. These investors used
shareholder value to measure performance, publicly targeted
underperforming firms, strongly backed equity-based compensation
for CEOs, and “organized ‘just vote no’ campaigns in director elections
to protest continued poor performance.”117 The next decades have
shown a further increase in shareholder power and strong governance.
3. The 2000s: The Age of Hedge Fund Activism. The increase in
power of institutional investors continued in the 2000s. In parallel to
strengthening internal governance mechanisms,118 a new powerful

110. Id. at 433.
111. Benjamin E. Hermalin, Trends in Corporate Governance, 60 J. FIN. 2351, 2351 (2005).
112. Edmans et al., supra note 109, at 433.
113. Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, in
2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211, 225 & fig.3 (George M. Constantinides,
Milton Harris & René M. Stulz eds., 2013).
114. Edmans et al., supra note 109, at 399 fig.5.
115. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 283, 290 tbl.4 (2005).
116. Hall & Liebman, Taxation, supra note 102, at 5.
117. Gordon, supra note 101, at 1528–29.
118. For example, “[a]nnual director elections, majority vote rules for director elections,
shareholder approval for poison pills, and proxy access bylaws are some of the critical governance
practices that have become common practice thanks to investor support,” as one booster put it.
See Kosmas Papadopoulos, The Long View: The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Shaping U.S.
Corporate Governance (2000-2018), HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/the-long-view-the-role-of-shareholder-proposals-inshaping-u-s-corporate-governance-2000-2018 [https://perma.cc/3JVD-ARYN]. A more skeptical
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external governance mechanism—hedge fund activism—has
emerged.119 Activist hedge funds, which have gained dominance in the
market over the last two decades,120 have carved out a market niche by
acquiring stakes in underperforming firms and implementing measures
to boost performance.121 Although common owners do not normally
agitate for operational change at their portfolio firms, activists do—and
common owners support them, especially when the proposed changes
align with their governance agenda.122 The presence of common owners
makes it more likely that an activist hedge fund will (successfully) try
to replace a company’s managers.123 Support for hedge fund activists is,
therefore, a strong-governance mechanism in its own right.

observer described how activists have capitalized on the “rhetorical high ground” of director
accountability to push for special meetings power, the ability to act through majority consents,
the elimination of supermajority requirements, and more. Latham & Watkins LLP, Future of
Institutional Share Voting: Three Paradigms, CORP. GOVERNANCE COMMENT. (July 2010), https:/
/www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub3617_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H87-NRKA]. The larger
point is that institutional investors support a diverse and rapidly evolving group of stronggovernance measures including those mentioned here, the effect of which is to put the fate of
directors more and more into the hands of their shareholders.
119. Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present and Future of Shareholder Activism
by Hedge Funds 34 (Univ. of Cambridge Fac. of L. Legal Studs. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 38/
2011, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1932805 [https://perma.cc/2JDC-9JEL] (addressing the
rise to prominence of hedge fund activism in the 2000s).
120. Activist hedge funds grew from less than $3 billion in AUM in 2000 to almost $200 billion
in 2015. See AIMA & SIMMONS & SIMMONS, UNLOCKING VALUE: THE ROLE OF ACTIVIST
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MANAGERS 12 fig.1 http://www.sewkis.com/wp-content/uploads/
9386e594-838e-46c0-a842-3d914714aee3.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEW2-29WQ]; Paula Loop, Catherine
Bromilow & Leah Malone, The Changing Face of Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/01/the-changingface-of-shareholder-activism [https://perma.cc/WX7P-VHTS]. Meanwhile, activist events increased
from 78 in 2000 to almost 428 in 2016. Mark R. DesJardine & Rodolphe Durand, Disentangling
the Effects of Hedge Fund Activism on Firm Financial and Social Performance, 41 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 1054, 1063 (2020).
121. See generally Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) [hereinafter Brav
et al., Hedge Fund Activism] (using a novel data set to chronicle the acquisition and proxy
behavior of activist hedge funds).
122. See Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism, 32 REV. FIN. STUDS. 2720, 2752 (2019) (“[W]e
only find . . . increased activists’ successes in areas that passive investors view as beneficial for
their long-term interests; in particular, effective boards, good governance, and a strong market
for corporate control.”).
123. See Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 121, at 1755 (“Governance issues,
including rescinding takeover defenses, ousting CEOs, promoting board independence, and
curtailing executive compensation, are also commonly cited as reasons for activism.”).
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Additionally, hedge fund activism and its support among common
owners has a more direct impact on governance. Hedge funds often use
weak governance as an excuse to mount activist campaigns against
corporate management.124 Activist campaigns are more likely to
succeed when they advocate for board efficiency and independence
and against takeover defenses.125 In other words, hedge funds do the
work of fighting for stronger shareholder rights, with passive owners
supporting them from the sidelines.
Indeed, during the 2000s, with the help of activists, common
owners kept pushing firms toward increased shareholder power,
particularly campaigning against antitakeover protections.126 The
conventional wisdom is that removing antitakeover protections deters
inefficient investments by exposing underperforming managers to a
hostile takeover threat.127 But the fear of a takeover also deters loyal
managers from making efficient investments.128 Because some

124. Id.
125. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
126. As early as 1999, corporate law scholars noted that “[i]nstitutional investors ha[d] gone
from expressing intense criticism of this device[, the poison pill,] to challenging particular aspects
of its operation, in addition to seeking mandatory removal of it from the arsenal of corporate
defenses.” See John H. Matheson, Corporate Governance at the Millennium: The Decline of the
Poison Pill Antitakeover Defense, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 703, 704 (1999); see also Francis J. Aquila,
Adopting a Poison Pill in Response to Shareholder Activism, PRACTICAL L. 22, 24–25 (2016).
127. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 993 (2002) (arguing that “takeover threat provides managers with an
important source of incentives to serve shareholders”). In today’s market, such a takeover would
likely be dressed up as a “friendly” acquisition. See, e.g., Tingting Liu & J. Harold Mulherin, How
Has Takeover Competition Changed over Time?, 49 J. CORP. FIN. 104, 104 (2018) (“[W]e find that
takeover competition across the entire auction process between deal initiation and completion
has not declined. In effect, takeover competition via auctions has gone underground.”).
128. See, e.g., Mark Humphery Jenner, Takeover Defenses, Innovation, and Value Creation:
Evidence from Acquisition Decisions, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 668, 668 (2014) (finding that hardto-value firms that have antitakeover provisions make acquisitions that generate more
shareholder wealth and are more likely to increase corporate innovation); Thomas J. Chemmanur
& Xuan Tian, Do Antitakeover Provisions Spur Corporate Innovation? A Regression
Discontinuity Analysis, 53 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1163, 1163 (2018) (“[Antitakeover
provisions] help nurture innovation by insulating managers from short-term pressures arising
from equity markets.”); Vivian Fang, Xuan Tian & Sheri Tice, Does Stock Liquidity Enhance or
Impede Firm Innovation?, 69 J. FIN. 2085, 2085 (2014) (finding that liquidity impedes innovation
because of increased exposure to hostile takeovers and higher presence of institutional investors);
Mark S. Johnson & Ramesh P. Rao, The Impact of Antitakeover Amendments on Corporate
Financial Performance, 32 FIN. REV. 659, 686–87 (1997) (finding that R&D expenditure increases
with the adoption of antitakeover amendments because managers are less fearful of takeover
attempts as a result of poor performance). A study that found the opposite result was criticized
for using antitakeover laws as an exogenous event. See Julian Atanassov, Do Hostile Takeovers
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visionary, hard-to-evaluate, or long-term investments are underpriced
by the market, talented and loyal managers are often exposed to
unjustified hostile takeovers.129 Nonetheless, as shown below, common
owners have more or less eliminated the use of the most potent
antitakeover protections—poison pills and staggered boards—creating
a chilling effect on investment levels.
a. Poison Pills. Poison pills restrict shareholders’ right to sell to a
hostile buyer, preventing potential raiders from taking over a company
without board approval.130 The poison pill, also known as a
“shareholder rights plan,” is a corporate device that allows a board of
directors to make the purchase of the company’s shares beyond a
specified threshold prohibitively costly and thereby block hostile
takeovers.131 Practically, selling to a raider who intends to replace the
board amounts to a vote to fire the management. Thus, common
owners see poison pills as entrenching boards and preventing
shareholders from holding corporate managers accountable by
Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting, 68 J. FIN.
1097, 1097 (2013) (finding a decline in the number of patents and citations per patent for firms
incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do
not); Jonathan M. Karpoff & Michael D. Wittry, Institutional and Legal Context in Natural
Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws, 73 J. FIN. 657, 668 (2018) (criticizing studies
using the legislation of state antitakeover laws as a relevant event); Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel
Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68 STAN. L. REV. 629, 629 (2016)
(providing additional analysis to explain why studies using antitakeover laws are flawed).
129. See, e.g., Jeremy Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61,
61 (1988) (“If stockholders are imperfectly informed, temporarily low earnings may cause the
stock to become undervalued, increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price;
hence the managerial concern with current bottom line.”); Eitan Arom, Hidden Value Injury, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 937, 950–52 (2021) (arguing that markets may fail to factor long-term value
information into short-term prices).
130. Effectively, poison pills stand between a willing seller—the shareholder—and a willing
buyer—the tender offeror. See Scott Hirst, The Wrong Prescription? Revisiting the Justification
for Poison Pills, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 18, 2009), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2009/11/18/the-wrong-prescription-revisiting-the-justification-for-poison-pills [https:/
/perma.cc/H2ZE-HUPA].
131. Specifically, in adopting a pill, a company will issue rights to its stockholders that allow
them to buy the company’s stock at a substantial discount to the prevailing market price. These
rights are triggered only if a stockholder buys enough stock to cross a specific ownership threshold
of the company’s total shares, such as 20 percent. Importantly, the pill voids any rights issued to
the offending stockholder who crossed the threshold, so only other investors are allowed to buy
discounted shares. This substantially dilutes the offending stockholder’s ownership position,
making it economically irrational to ever buy enough stock to cross the threshold in the first place.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison
Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1570 (2014).
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selling.132 Indeed, while poison pills became widely popular after Marty
Lipton invented them in the 1980s,133 they have since come under fire
from institutional investors.134 Not only do proxy advisors suggest
voting against poison pills, but they also recommend voting against any
director who votes to adopt one without shareholder approval.135
Consequently, the 299 S&P 500 companies with poison pills in 2000
dwindled to 84 by 2009.136
b. Staggered Boards. Staggered boards are elected in classes: a third of
the board comes up for election each year, rather than all at once.137
Accordingly, they protect corporate managers by preventing
shareholders from replacing the entire board at once.138 A shareholder
who gains control of a company with a staggered board must wait for
two rounds of annual director elections to gain a board majority.139
Because of their entrenching effect, staggered boards have drawn the
ire of common owners.140 Consequently, institutional investors
provided the momentum for the “de-staggering movement”141 that left

132. See Aquila, supra note 126.
133. David Futrelle, Corporate Raiders Beware: A Short History of the “Poison Pill”
Takeover Defense, TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), https://business.time.com/2012/11/07/corporate-raidersbeware-a-short-history-of-the-poison-pill-takeover-defense [https://perma.cc/CK5X-7X4Z].
134. Appel et al., Passive Investors, supra note 81, at 114 (finding that companies with higher
levels of index fund ownership were less likely to have takeover defenses or dual-class structures).
135. See Aquila, supra note 126, at 25.
136. Michael Useem, The Ascent of Shareholder Monitoring and Strategic Partnering: The
Dual Functions of the Corporate Board, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 136, 143 (Thomas Clarke & Douglas Branson eds., 2012).
137. See Staggered Board of Directors, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL L. (2020), https://
us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/7-382-3831 [https://perma.cc/4RS3-AA45] (defining a staggered
or classified board as a “board which is comprised of directors that have different overlapping,
multi-year terms, so that not all of the directors’ terms expire in the same year”).
138. See Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83
J. FIN. ECON. 501, 528 (2007) (concluding that “classified boards benefit management at the
expense of shareholders” and “a movement toward greater accountability demands the
destaggering of corporate boards”).
139. See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 n.17 (Del. Ch. 1998) (noting that “a
classified board would delay—but not prevent—a hostile acquiror from obtaining control of the
board”).
140. See Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (2014) (claiming
that institutional investors dislike staggering boards because it leaves them with “‘little recourse’
in the everyday course of business against specific directors that they wish to punish”).
141. Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Toward Board Declassification in 100 S&P
500 and Fortune 500 Companies: The SRP’s Report for the 2012 and 2013 Proxy Seasons, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 25, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/25/
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about 10 percent of the S&P 500 corporations with staggered boards in
2017,142 compared to 60 percent in 2002.143
The mechanisms detailed above are by no means exhaustive of
common owners’ forty-year campaign for strong governance.
However, these mechanisms and many others—pushed as part of a
one-size-fits-all policy to strengthen corporate governance across the
board144—serve to subject managers to shareholders’ will.
Consequently, common owners have reshaped the corporate
hierarchy, putting shareholders at the top. Part II shows how this
fundamental shift has led to a downturn in investment, with
inauspicious effects on U.S. workers.
II. STRONG GOVERNANCE AND LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY
The rise of common ownership has led to a troubling shift in the
U.S. labor market. Even as workers became more and more
productive, wages stopped growing.145 Income inequality climbed to its
highest levels since the Roaring Twenties,146 while firms enjoyed
blockbuster profits and growing profit margins.147 Moreover, wage
toward-board-declassification-in-100-sp-500-and-fortune-500-companies-the-srps-report-for-the
-2012-and-2013-proxy-seasons [https://perma.cc/Y6LH-8C89].
142. Matteo Tonello, Corporate Board Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 18, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/18/
corporate-board-practices-in-the-russell-3000-and-sp-500 [https://perma.cc/3QRT-3JGA] (“[C]lassified
boards are still found at . . . 10.9 percent of S&P 500 companies (down from 15.4 percent in 2016)
. . . .”).
143. K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and LongTerm Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 422, 428 fig.1 (2017) (finding that “staggered
boards promote value creation for some firms by committing the firm to undertaking long-term
projects and bonding it to the relationship-specific investments of its stakeholders”).
144. See, e.g., Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 917 (2007)
(describing how institutional shareholders, with the help of governance advisory firms, have
developed a “one-size-fits-all model [that] essentially standardizes corporate governance and
discourages company-specific (or even industry-specific) governance policies”).
145. See Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares, 75 J. FIN. 2421, 2459 (2020)
(“The decline in the labor share since the early 1980s measures the growing gap between labor
productivity (which has continued to grow) and compensation (which has stagnated).”).
146. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
147. See Barkai, supra note 145, at 2434 fig.3 (modeling firm “profit share”—profits over
gross value added—to show it has grown at least since the 1980s). According to a Bloomberg
opinion piece,
[t]he profit margin for the S&P 500 Index, or income as a percentage of revenue,
swelled to 10.2 percent in 2018, the highest since 1990. The ratio of corporate profits as
a percentage of GDP hit the highest on record in 2012, according to the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, and that ratio has remained elevated.
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elasticity—a measure of labor market competitiveness—has fallen
over recent decades, suggesting that employers have cartelized the
labor market.148 So far, scholars who have pointed to common
ownership as a cause of stagnating wages and rising income inequality
have focused on product-market monopolies and concentration,149 a
theory that is highly debated.150 Thus, despite the magnitude of the shift
to common ownership, observers have failed to find a convincing
explanation linking it to the struggling labor market.151 After all, if
common owners were rigging the market—against either workers or
consumers—one would think they would leave some traces.152 If
common owners are indeed the source of labor market malaise, where
is the evidence?
This Article provides a simple answer: because of their size and
influence, common owners need not consciously act as a cartel to have
a cartel’s effects. Instead, those effects flow naturally from common
owners’ push for strong governance. Under strong governance, both
loyal and disloyal managers will decrease investments for fear that
shareholders will (mis)perceive their investments as inefficient pet
projects.153 Under a strong-governance regime, a rational manager—
Kaissar, supra note 2.
148. One set of researchers surveyed recent scholarship of wage elasticity and found that
“even if one takes a conservative approach and believes the studies with weaker findings, it
remains clear that monopsony causes considerable harm both to the economy and to workers.”
Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132
HARV. L. REV. 536, 568 (2018) (reviewing the empirical data on mergers and suggesting an
antitrust remedy).
149. See generally Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investmentless Growth, supra note 11 (testing
industry and firm level data sets); Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 15 (“We
conclude that a hidden cost—reduced product market competition—accompanies the private
benefits of diversification and good governance.”).
150. See infra note 264 (citing studies debating common ownership theory).
151. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investmentless Growth, supra note 11, at 108 n.24 (noting
that “the exact mechanisms through which common ownership reduces competition remain to be
identified”).
152. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 39, at 1426 (noting that the anticompetitive effects
of common ownership, “if important in practice, would leave a visible trace”).
153. The main task of a firm’s CEO is selecting investment projects that maximize the value
of the firm. However, a central tenet in the agency theory is that some investment projects deliver
pecuniary or nonpecuniary private benefits to the CEO and drive a wedge between the incentives
of managers and shareholders. In such cases, the CEO might select a project that maximizes his
or her private benefits but not the firm’s value. The literature in corporate governance has pegged
such inefficient investments as CEO pet projects. For an illustration of such projects, see
generally, for example, Paul H. Décaire & Denis Sosyura, CEO Pet Projects (Apr. 9, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3747263 [https://perma.cc/3HNJ-KJW2].
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regardless of loyalty—will distribute profits instead of investing them
in either innovative or long-term projects (loyal managers) or in pet
projects (disloyal managers) to avoid running afoul of shareholders
and risking termination.154 By pushing firms toward strong governance,
common owners thus create an investment shortfall.155 Less investment
means less hiring156; less hiring means lower labor demand157; lower
labor demand leads to stagnant wages. Thus, common owners’ push for
strong governance has exacerbated—if not altogether caused—the last
forty years of labor market stagnation.
The previous Part shows how the market has shifted from retail to
primarily common ownership and how common owners have brought
on an era of strong governance. This Part shows that strong governance
holds wages below their competitive level, effectively denying workers
the fruits of their labor. The empirical evidence for the monopsony
effect can be broken into two categories: evidence that strong
governance has led to an investment shortfall and evidence that the
labor market has become less competitive due to common owners’
influence. Part II.A addresses the former, examining the evidence that
strong governance depresses investment. Part II.B looks at the latter,
showing how stagnant wages and rising income inequality can be
attributed directly to common owners. Together, these empirical
findings supply a comprehensive explanation for rising inequality and
stagnating wages over the past four decades.

154. See infra Part II.A.1.
155. See, e.g., Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investmentless Growth, supra note 11, at 89 (finding
that the lack of investment represents a reluctance to invest despite high Tobin’s Q (a measure of
profitability) and that the investment wedge is linked to the rise of intangibles, decreased
competition, and changes in governance that encourage payouts instead of investment).
156. See Belo et al., supra note 26, at 138 (reporting that “the hiring and investment rates are
positively correlated”). Indeed, investment in technology and innovation can decrease
employment (say, the development of a robot). This is the essence of the theory associating
technology and intangible assets with decreased investment and labor share. However, an
empirical study has found that this effect can only explain a third of the drop in investment.
Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Ownership, Concentration, and Investment, 108 AEA
PAPERS & PROC. 432, 436 (2018) [hereinafter Gutiérrez & Philippon, Ownership, Concentration,
and Investment]. This Article contends that the rest is explained by common ownership and
governance.
157. See generally Daniel S. Hamermesh, New Measures of Labor Cost: Implications for
Demand Elasticities and Nominal Wage Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 821, 1981), https://www.nber.org/papers/w0821 [https://perma.cc/3ZVJ-BRF7] (measuring
labor elasticity, or the responsiveness of labor prices to labor demand).
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A. Strong Governance and Investment
Prior to the rise of institutional investors, directors and officers ran
corporations more or less exactly how they saw fit. The poster children
of this era were domineering corporate leaders such as longtime
Chrysler chief Lee Iacocca, whose surname was famously said to be an
acronym for “I Am Chairman Of Chrysler Corporation Always.”158
Managers like Iacocca were free to build empires and hoard private
benefits of control, or otherwise nurture bold visions of the future and
undertake daring investments.159 As ownership concentrated in the
hands of powerful institutional shareholders with the wherewithal to
oversee corporate affairs,160 managers became less likely to invest. This
Section first examines the mechanism by which strong governance
decreases investment and next details the empirical evidence that it
indeed has had that effect.
1. The Manager’s Dilemma: To Invest, or Not to Invest? Generally,
managers face a choice between two options: reinvest surplus cash in
projects that will hopefully pay off later, or distribute that surplus to
shareholders in the form of dividends and share buybacks.161 When
shareholders do not interfere, managers can decide based on their
conscience and best judgment. Loyal managers will make beneficial,
efficient investments, and disloyal managers will make self-serving,
inefficient investments and consume private benefits.162 However,

158. ‘I Am Chairman Of Chrysler Corporation Always’: 8 Facts About Lee Iacocca, REUTERS
(July 2, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-people-lee-iacocca-facts/i-am-chairman-ofchrysler-corporation-always-8-facts-about-lee-iacocca-idUSKCN1TY06X [https://perma.cc/YU
L9-SEKM].
159. See Roe, supra note 55, at 14 (describing the criticism that, under dispersed ownership,
“[m]anagers build empires and pursue bad strategies without shareholder intervention until
matters are so out-of-hand that the violence of the hostile takeover or the instability of the
leveraged buyout results”).
160. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 41, at 865 (noting that, because of the concentration
of ownership in the hands of a few financial institutions, “the Berle-Means premise of dispersed
share ownership is now wrong”).
161. See William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2014), https:/
/hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity [https://perma.cc/4VFX-6WD6] (describing how the
“retain-and-reinvest” approach to corporate resource allocation gave way to a “downsize-anddistribute” approach (emphasis omitted)).
162. See, e.g., Jarrad Harford, Sattar A. Mansi & William F. Maxwell, Corporate Governance
and Firm Cash Holdings in the US, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 535, 535 (2008) (finding that in the United
States, weakly controlled managers choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital
expenditures, rather than hoard it); Matthew T. Billett, Jon A. Garfinkel & Yi Jiang, The
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when shareholders are breathing down managers’ necks, this choice is
much more fraught. An investment that causes shareholders to doubt
a CEO’s loyalty could cost the CEO’s job.163 Under strong governance,
then, managers will disproportionately choose to distribute profits.164
Key to this insight is the fact that shareholders are imperfect
judges of manager performance and loyalty: being human, they will
sometimes make mistakes.165 Even sophisticated investors can mistake
a competent and loyal manager for an incompetent and disloyal one.
Steve Jobs’ early tenure at Apple is illustrative.166 Jobs was the
company’s visionary but was notoriously difficult to work with, and he
lost his job after the board of directors sided against him and with the
CEO. More than a decade later, he took back the company’s helm as
it teetered on the edge of bankruptcy and reasserted Apple’s tech
dominance by releasing the iMac.167 Even sophisticated and deeply
informed directors with a real stake in Apple’s continuing performance
were wrong about Jobs: despite his domineering attitude and exacting

Influence of Governance on Investment: Evidence from a Hazard Model, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 643,
643 (2011) (finding that poor governance associates with overinvestment).
163. See, e.g., Heitor Almeida, Vyacheslav Fos & Mathias Kronlund, The Real Effects of
Share Repurchases, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 168, 168 (2016) (finding that managers are willing to trade
off investments and employment for stock repurchases that allow them to meet analyst earningper-share forecasts); Huasheng Gao, Jarrad Harford & Kai Li, CEO Turnover–Performance
Sensitivity in Private Firms, 52 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 583, 583 (2017) (finding that
CEOs in public firms have higher turnover rates and exhibit greater turnover-performance
sensitivity than in private firms, mainly due to investors’ myopia).
164. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investmentless Growth, supra note 11, at 104 (showing that
firms with higher passive institutional ownership have higher payouts and lower investment);
Todd A. Gormley & David A. Matsa, Playing It Safe? Managerial Preferences, Risk, and Agency
Conflicts, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 432 (2016) (arguing that managers are motivated by their career
concerns to “play it safe” by taking on less risk—and thus lower return—than shareholders would
prefer in order to avoid being fired); Pornsit Jiraporn, Jang-Chul Kim & Young Sang Kim,
Dividend Payout and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation, 46 FIN. REV.
251, 275 (2011) (showing that “firms with better governance quality” disproportionately distribute
profits instead of reinvesting them).
165. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 23, at 803 (“[I]nvestors could misattribute disloyalty,
bad measurements, or bad luck to incompetence, and then generate principal costs by firing a
competent manager.”); Roe, supra note 55, at 13–14 (“[D]ispersed investors cannot cheaply
distinguish egoistic empire-building from a high net present value project.”).
166. See Matt Weinberger, This Is Why Steve Jobs Got Fired from Apple—and How He Came
Back To Save the Company, BUS. INSIDER (July 31, 2017, 2:17 PM), https://www.business
insider.com/steve-jobs-apple-fired-returned-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/N5Y2-ZYHK].
167. Id.
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attention to detail, he was a good bet.168 In their capacity as
shareholders, managers of institutional investors spread their attention
across thousands of portfolio corporations and, consequently, are even
more likely to make these types of mistakes than Apple’s onetime
directors.169
By reducing investments and increasing payouts, disloyal (loyal)
managers decrease the possibility they will be perceived
(misperceived) as disloyal and fired. Even for loyal managers,
undertaking a complex, long-term, or innovative investment project
introduces a chance of failure, reprimand, and removal.170 Thus, under
strong governance, CEOs will rationally choose to distribute profits
instead of taking a career risk by reinvesting them.171
By contrast, the managers of weak-governance firms do not have
to worry about being removed by shareholders, whether in response to
an inefficient investment or to a bold, visionary one. Another tech
company—Facebook (now Meta)—illustrates this point. In 2019,
Facebook’s Chairman and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, introduced the
cryptocurrency project Libra as an important new objective for the
company and a revolution in digital finance. Critics saw it as a pet
project with no apparent benefits to the company.172 The same month
that Facebook announced Libra, outside investors attempted to strip
Zuckerberg of the chairmanship as a check on his leadership. More
than two-thirds of outside investors voted in favor of the move.173
However, while Zuckerberg owned only a small minority of
Facebook’s economic value, he held 58 percent of its voting power by
168. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 23, at 580 (citing Jobs as an example of idiosyncratic
vision being inefficiently disrupted by shareholders).
169. John C. Wilcox & Morrow Sodali, Getting Along with BlackRock, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 6, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/11/06/getting-alongwith-blackrock [https://perma.cc/CG78-GRQU] (noting that BlackRock’s “Investment Stewardship”
team of thirty employees votes in about 17,000 shareholder elections and meets with 1500
companies each year).
170. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 23, at 786–87.
171. See supra note 164.
172. See Lionel Laurent, Opinion, Facebook’s Answer to Bitcoin Poses a Double Threat,
BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-17/
facebook-libra-crypto-currency-is-another-zuckerberg-threat [https://perma.cc/SRA8-UVFU] (noting
that the “bid to launch an online payments revolution carries plenty of risks, from antitrust
concerns to the threat that it might pose to financial stability”).
173. See Betsy Atkins, Facebook Strong Arms Investors Who Want Zuckerberg Out, FORBES
(June 7, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/betsyatkins/2019/06/07/facebook-strongarms-investors-who-want-zuckerberg-out/#37f0d85b5901 [https://perma.cc/4BSX-9BAX].
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virtue of a dual-class structure and easily blocked the measure.174 Of
course, only time will reveal who was right. Still, the Libra saga
illustrates that in weak-governance firms such as Facebook, managers
can invest in projects they see as worthwhile without worrying that
shareholders might disagree—and fire them.
Indeed, dual-class structures employed by many technology
corporations are the strongest form of weak governance.175 However,
weak governance can insulate managers even within the more common
one-share-one-vote structure. One such illustration is the famous
attempt of Air Products to take over Airgas in 2010 for $5 billion.
Despite the major support among Airgas shareholders for the takeover
bid, Airgas management resisted the takeover using an antitakeover
defense that combined a poison pill and a staggered board, which
effectively meant that an acquirer needed to win two consecutive proxy
contests in order to effect a hostile takeover.176 Air Products challenged
these measures in court, but the Delaware chancery court approved
them.177 Airgas continued with its business strategy as an independent
corporation, and in 2015, it was sold for $10 billion, twice as much as
the takeover price.178
In sum, because shareholders can easily remove managers under
strong governance, those managers generally will refrain from
investing and choose to distribute excess cash instead. In weakgovernance companies, managers can invest according to their
business sense and conscience (loyal or disloyal) without worrying
about discipline from shareholders and thus are likely to invest more.
This logic predicts that, by moving firms en masse toward strong
governance, common owners will create an investment shortfall.
Indeed, the following subsection shows that they have done just that.

174. Id.
175. Dhruv Aggarwal, Ofer Eldar, Yael V. Hochberg & Lubomir P. Litov, The Rise of DualClass Stock IPOs, 144 J. FIN. ECON. 122, 123 (2022) (documenting and explaining the rise of dualclass IPOs in recent years).
176. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904
(2002) (describing the combined effect of poison pills and staggered boards and testing their effect
on insulating management).
177. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55 (Del. Ch. 2011).
178. Leslie Picker, Why Airgas Was Finally Sold, for $10 Billion Instead of $5 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/business/dealbook/why-airgas-wasfinally-sold-for-10-billion-instead-of-5-billion.html [https://perma.cc/2BVC-EXRW].
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2. Strong Governance and the Investment Shortfall.
The
investment shortfall affects many types of corporate activities—such as
less investment in research and development (“R&D”), fewer new
factories, and fewer new stores and branches—all of which will lead to
less hiring. Different measures track the beginning of the investment
shortfall to different periods. The investment growth rate as a portion
of the U.S. GDP has fallen since 1980.179 Investment relative to firms’
profitability has declined since the middle of the 1990s180 or, at the
latest, since 2000.181 Notably, the latter study linking common
ownership to decreased investment claimed it has shown causation.182
Rather than reinvest profits, firms have increasingly distributed them
to shareholders, including through share buybacks.183 Moreover, in
industries with high proportions of common ownership, one study
found that “firms spend a disproportionate amount of free cash flows
buying back their shares.”184 In sum, firms are investing less than they
once did because of common owners’ influence.
179. Total Investment (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/
indicators/inv.all.pct?country=USA&indicator=345&viz=line_chart&years=1980,2024 [https://p
erma.cc/P9QP-3YFZ]; Jordan Brennan, Rising Corporate Concentration, Declining Trade Union
Power, and the Growing Income Gap: American Prosperity in Historical Perspective 12 fig.3
(Feb. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/e_pamphlet_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EBV-ZLB9].
180. Lee and coauthors find that the decline had already started in the middle of the 1990s.
See Dong Lee, Han Shin & René M. Stulz, Why Does Capital No Longer Flow More to the
Industries with the Best Growth Opportunities? 0 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 22924, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22924 [https://perma.cc/JT74-LGD7] (showing
that since the middle of the 1990s, firms in high-Q industries increasingly repurchase shares and
decrease capital expenditures).
181. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investmentless Growth, supra note 11, at 89.
182. Id. at 131 (finding that higher quasi-indexer common ownership leads to higher
buybacks and less investment).
183. See id.; Kathleen Kahle & René M. Stulz, Why Are Corporate Payouts So High in the
2000s? 0 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26958, 2020), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w26958 [https://perma.cc/TB33-U9B6] (finding that inflation-adjusted amount paid out
through dividends and repurchases by public industrial firms was three times larger from 2000 to
2019 than from 1971 to 1999); Ilan Strauss & Jangho Yang, The Global Investment Slowdown:
Corporate Secular Stagnation and the Draining of the Cash Flow Swamp 0 (Oxford Martin
Programme on Tech. & Econ. Change, Working Paper No. 2019-5, 2019), https://www.oxford
martin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The-Global-Investment-Slowdown.pdf [https://perma.cc/C
8EE-ET87] (finding that firms “are increasingly net external ‘releasers’ of funds to shareholders,
creditors, and bondholders, reflecting cross-cutting exogenous factors creating a chronic excess of
cash flow over weakening investment opportunities”).
184. Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment in the
U.S. 1 n.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23583, 2017), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w23583 [https://perma.cc/G87B-3R3U].
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Additional empirical studies support the claim that companies are
reducing investments because of the influence of strong governance.185
Increased shareholder rights are associated with lower capital
expenditures186 and less R&D spending.187 More recent studies have
confirmed the negative correlation between strong governance and
investment, finding, as one example, that strong-governance firms less
frequently make large investments.188 In short, firms with strong
governance invest less.189
Declining investment has had profound economic consequences.
Lower investment across the board means less hiring, and less hiring
means lower wages. The following Section shows how reduced
investment has created a wage monopsony, taking money out of the
pockets of workers and putting it into the hands of shareholders.
B. Strong Governance and Wage Stagnation
The previous Section shows how strong governance has created an
investment shortfall, which naturally reduces hiring. As investment
declined compared to GDP,190 the percentage of the U.S. workforce
working for public firms has fallen sharply from more than 40 percent

185. The discussion above excludes the effects of governance on mergers and acquisitions
because while strong governance decreases inefficient buying of other corporations (a demand
side effect), it increases efficient selling of corporations (a supply side effect). It is inconclusive
which effect dominates. Moreover, the welfare effects of mergers are also unresolved. See
Bronwyn H. Hall, The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Development, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 69, 70 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988)
(“The question whether increased merger activity is a good thing for the economy in general
remains unresolved and unlikely to be resolved by focusing solely on the experience of the firms
involved.”).
186. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,
118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 133–34 (2003).
187. See Florence Honoré, Federico Munari & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de La Potterie,
Corporate Governance Practices and Companies’ R&D Intensity: Evidence from European
Countries, 44 RSCH. POL’Y 533, 541 (2015) (finding that strong-governance measures are
negatively correlated with R&D intensity and are detrimental to long-term R&D investments);
Tao-Hsien Dolly King & Min-Ming Wen, Shareholder Governance, Bondholder Governance, and
Managerial Risk-Taking, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 512, 513 (2011); supra note 128 and accompanying
text.
188. Billett et al., supra note 162, at 644 (“[W]eak shareholder protection (managerial
entrenchment)[] associates with more frequent investment spikes.”).
189. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investmentless Growth, supra note 11, at 121, 122 tbl.3
(estimating that common ownership and governance explain 80 percent of the reduced
investment effects).
190. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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in 1973 to 29 percent in 2019.191 This Section looks at the evidence
linking common ownership to wage stagnation.
The monopsony effect makes a powerful set of predictions that are
borne out in labor market data.192 In particular, it predicts that under
common ownership, even when workers become more productive,
firms will still refrain from increased hiring because the stronggovernance regime makes investing (hiring) risky for managers.193
Hiring and wages will remain low even as marginal productivity rises,
with shareholders capturing the difference. In short, the monopsony
effect predicts wages will not increase as much to reflect the higher
productivity while shareholder returns grow—a prediction borne out
in macroeconomic data.
Recently, Professor José Azar and his co-authors tested the
relationship and causation between common ownership, wages, and
employment. They have found that “an increase in common ownership
in a labor market is associated with decreases in both wages per
employee and the employment-to-population ratio.”194 Moreover, they
have conducted an event study using the acquisition of Barclays Global
Investors by BlackRock in 2009—which made BlackRock the world’s
biggest asset manager195—and found that “markets that were more
affected by the acquisition experienced post-acquisition decreases in
annual wages per employee and employment-to-population.”196 This is
direct evidence supporting our model describing the transmission
mechanism between common ownership and wage stagnation.
Similarly, using confidential establishment-level data from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database from 1982–
2015, Antonio Falato and his co-authors. found that “firms owned by

191. Schlingemann & Stulz, supra note 19.
192. For one study offering an alternative explanation of the data focused on the decline of
“worker power,” see Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power
Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy 2–3, 6–7 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27193, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193
[https://perma.cc/68KH-WY8B]. However, because the study defined “worker power” as the
product of de-unionization and changes in corporate ownership, see id. at 2, it partially overlaps
with the explanation of this Article.
193. See supra Part II.A.1.
194. Azar et al., supra note 33.
195. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, BlackRock To Buy BGI, Becomes Top Asset Manager, REUTERS
(June 11, 2009, 7:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackrock-barclays/blackrock-tobuy-bgi-becomes-top-asset-manager-idUSTRE55B06X20090612 [https://perma.cc/5TKG-H9EN].
196. Azar et al., supra note 33.
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larger and more concentrated institutional shareholders have lower
employment and payroll” and that “[t]he labor losses are accompanied
by higher shareholder returns.”197 This is additional direct evidence
supporting our model.
Moreover, the so-called “productivity-pay gap” provides further
damning evidence of the monopsony effect.198 Before the 1980s, the
higher their marginal output, the more workers were paid—that is, the
more revenue they netted for their employers, the more money they
took home.199 At about the same time common owners came on the
scene, productivity and wages began to diverge.200 Since then, wages
and productivity have drifted apart, a telltale sign of anticompetitive
labor pricing.201 One study estimates that labor has become four-anda-half times more productive in the last forty years while wages
stalled.202
With wages flatlining and worker productivity rising, common
owners are taking a bigger and bigger cut of corporate revenue. Profitsper-worker have grown year-over-year since at least the 1980s, but they
have accrued to shareholders rather than workers. In 2014, companies
captured $14,600 more in profits for each worker than they did in
1980—an increase in corporate profits totaling $1.2 trillion.203 And
workers got the short end of the stick. Median hourly wages rose just
0.2 percent annually between 1979 and 2013, and more specifically,
between 2000 and 2013, hourly wages of the vast majority of workers
either fell (bottom 30 percent) or were essentially flat (next 40

197. See Falato et al., supra note 32.
198. Cf. The Productivity–Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST., https://www.epi.org/productivitypay-gap [https://perma.cc/DA5U-R5MM], (last updated Aug. 2021) (“From 1979 to 2020, net
productivity rose 61.8%, while the hourly pay of typical workers grew far slower—increasing only
17.5% over four decades (after adjusting for inflation).”).
199. See Barkai, supra note 145 (“Labor compensation in the U.S. economy used to track
labor productivity. Up until the 1980s, increases in labor productivity were accompanied by
equally sized increases in labor compensation.”).
200. See id. (“The decline in the labor share since the early 1980s measures the growing gap
between labor productivity (which has continued to grow) and compensation (which has
stagnated).”). For a discussion of market concentration as a possible cause of the productivitypay gap, see infra Part III.E.3.
201. See Barkai, supra note 145, at 2460.
202. Abdul A. Erumban & Klaas de Vries, Wage-Productivity Growth Gap: An Analysis of
Industry Data 14–15 (Conf. Bd. Econ. Program, Working Paper No. 16-01, 2016), https://
www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/workingpapers/EPWP1601.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EQV-NJUH].
203. See Barkai, supra note 145, at 2423.
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percent).204 In short, while workers are bringing greater returns to their
employers, shareholders are taking a larger and larger cut of each
corporate dollar, suggesting that common owners have the market
power to reduce hiring and keep wages down.205
Figure 1 puts this finding in stark relief: as the average percentage
of shares held by common owners passed the 20 percent mark in the
late 1970s, compensation and productivity, both of which had
previously risen in concert, decoupled from each other, leaving
workers providing increasing economic value to corporations as their
hourly compensation has stagnated.

204. See BIVENS ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
205. In aggregate, this trend is captured by the labor share of income—the portion of annual
economic output that goes to labor as opposed to capital. After holding more or less steady since
World War II, that figure saw a significant decline since the 1980s, from 64 percent to 58 percent,
driven by a decrease in earnings for the lowest earners. Michael W.L. Elsby, Bart Hobijn &
Ayşegül Şahin, The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY,
Fall 2013, at 2.
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To see how a rising pay-productivity gap suggests a labor
monopsony,207 imagine a market where wages and marginal
productivity are initially equal at x, but productivity rises to 2x. In a
competitive economy, firms would compete to hire up workers until
wages rose to 2x, at which point wages would equal marginal product,
and firms would stop hiring.208 However, under a monopsony, firms
could refrain from hiring in order to keep wages at or near x and pocket
the difference.
Hedge fund activism provides a vivid example of how stronggovernance mechanisms allow shareholders to capture value from
workers. Being a strong-governance mechanism, hedge fund activism
campaigns supported by institutional investors reduce investments,
either by cutting inefficient investments of disloyal managers209 or
deterring efficient investments of loyal managers.210 These campaigns
often lead to layoffs and other spending cuts,211 and wages at target
firms stagnate even as productivity increases.212 The firm gets more
profitable, shareholders get richer, and workers get—you guessed it—
nothing.
The monopsony theory makes one final prediction: rising income
inequality.213 By holding wages below their competitive rates, the labor
206. In Figure 1, we combined the data from Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investment-less Growth
(Working Paper Version), supra note 15, and the data from Poterba & Samwick, supra note 62,
with data from BIVENS ET AL., supra note 1.
207. See Naidu et al., supra note 148, at 556 (explaining that a monopsonist will set wages
below marginal revenue).
208. Id. (“In a competitive labor market, firms equate the going wage of workers to their
‘marginal revenue product,’ the amount of additional revenue the worker can generate.”).
209. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1087, 1093 (2015) (describing the changes that activists
request that corporations will adopt, including reducing long-term investments).
210. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 605–06 (2016) (describing the activist
hedge fund practice of slashing research and development in pharmaceutical industry targets).
211. See DesJardine & Durand, supra note 120, at 1070–72.
212. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism:
Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2723, 2753 (2015) (“[O]n
average, workers at target firms do not share in the improvements associated with hedge fund
activism. They experience stagnation in wages, while their productivity improves significantly.”).
213. The focus of this Article is on inequality between wage-earners and capital-earners and
not between different classes of wage-earners. For the latter, see Jae Song, David J. Price, Fatih
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monopsony shifts wealth from labor-earners to capital-earners, who
tend to already be wealthier.214 Like Robin Hood in reverse, it steals
from the poor and gives to the rich. Indeed, it hardly needs to be
recounted here that income inequality has reached historic rates. The
wealth-to-income ratio—a measure of economic wealth captured by
the highest earners—has skewed sharply upward, doubling between
1970 and 2010 and appearing to return to its 1920 level.215 Similarly, the
income Gini index, which measures the degree of income inequality,
has consistently risen from about 36.6 percent in 1979 to 44.8 percent
in 2016, a record high.216
This Part has outlined the empirical evidence that common
ownership contributes to wage stagnation and economic inequality.
The following Part lays out the theory behind these effects. In
particular, it presents a stylized economic model that explains the
connection between wages and governance—and shows how common
owners act, inadvertently or not, to break that connection and profit
from decreased wages.
III. WAGE AND GOVERNANCE: BREAKING THE COMPETITIVE
EQUILIBRIUM
To better understand common ownership and the monopsony
effect, this Part outlines how common owners disrupt the relationship
between wages and governance structure. Part III.A models how
shareholders’ choice between weak and strong governance affects
managers’ investment decisions. Part III.B explains how the wage rate
depends on which governance structures shareholders choose. Part
III.C outlines the competitive equilibrium and explains that even
though it imposes management agency costs on shareholders, it
maximizes social welfare. Part III.D explains how common owners

Guvenen, Nicholas Bloom & Till von Wachter, Firming Up Inequality, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1 (2019)
(finding earning inequality between high-wage and low-wage workers).
214. See Naidu et al., supra note 148, at 537 (arguing that labor monopsony “reduces the
incomes of workers relative to those of people who live off capital, and the latter are almost
uniformly higher earners than the former”).
215. Thomas Piketty & Gabriel Zucman, Capital Is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich
Countries 1700–2010, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1255, 1257, 1259 fig.IV (2014).
216. Kaissar, supra note 2; James Elwell, Kevin Corinth & Richard V. Burkhauser, Income
Growth and Its Distribution from Eisenhower to Obama: The Growing Importance of In-Kind
Transfers (1959-2016), at 43 tbl.2, col.5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26439,
2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w26439 [https://perma.cc/AJW5-MZFM].
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break the competitive equilibrium and create a labor monopsony.
Finally, Part III.E compares the explanatory power of the common
ownership monopsony theory with other alternative theories.
A. Corporate Governance: The Risk of Management Disloyalty
Shareholder exposure to manager disloyalty depends on the
governance structure they choose. Weak governance increases the risk
of manager disloyalty, as managers can invest inefficiently and
expropriate private benefits without being disciplined by shareholders.
Strong governance minimizes this risk, as shareholders can hold
disloyal managers accountable.217 However, as explained above, weak
or strong governance will have parallel effects on loyal managers.218
Weak governance increases the incentive for both loyal and disloyal
managers to invest, while strong governance decreases that incentive.
The choice between strong and weak governance thus depends both on
the probability and cost of management disloyalty and the relative
gains from investing. In the absence of common ownership, each firm’s
shareholders will make governance choices the same way they would
make any other decision: which option will maximize the corporation’s
value? In other words, shareholders will choose between weak and
strong governance based on which structure increases their expected
returns.
A stylized economic model serves to illustrate this choice.219
Assume a market with one hundred corporations where none of the
corporations has market power over either products or resources.220
Shareholders—without market power over ownership of firms221—
must choose a governance structure for their respective corporations.

217. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323–28 (1976) (describing how
shareholders can invest in monitoring and bonding to reduce the cost of manager disloyalty).
218. See supra Part II.A.1.
219. The model presented here draws on the work of Goshen and Levit, supra note 22, at 4.
220. That is, firms are price takers inasmuch as they hire at the competitive rate determined
by the market. See David W. Berger, Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Simon Mongey, Labor Market Power
10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25719, 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w25719 [https://perma.cc/5WL5-ZCPE] (noting that all firms in a competitive equilibrium are
price takers).
221. See Market Power, OECD GLOSSARY OF STATISTICAL TERMS, https://stats.oecd.org/
glossary/detail.asp?ID=3256 [https://perma.cc/G3AR-C73G], (last updated Mar. 16, 2002)
(“Market power refers to the ability of a firm (or group of firms) to raise and maintain price above
the level that would prevail under competition . . . .”).
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Of course, corporate governance is a spectrum of structures allocating
various levels of control between shareholders and managers.222
However, for simplicity, assume that only two poles of governance
structures are available for shareholders223: either they can easily fire a
manager (“strong governance”), as in dispersed-ownership firms
without staggered boards or poison pills,224 or they cannot fire a
manager (“weak governance”), as in dual-class firms225 where public
shareholders own low-voting shares.226 Shareholders want to hire only
loyal managers but cannot distinguish between loyal and disloyal
CEOs.227 Suppose, further, that half of all candidates for the CEO job
are loyal and half are disloyal.228
Managers, once hired, face a discrete set of investment decisions.
They can either choose project A or project B. Both require the firm
to spend $1 million to hire a team of workers. Project A is a good
investment. At the end of the project, it will yield $1.5 million,
representing $500,000 in profits after accounting for the $1 million in
labor costs—a 50 percent profit. Project B is a pet project that allows
the manager to travel in style, hire relatives, elevate their social status,
and so on. It will yield an expected value of $500,000, representing
$500,000 in losses after accounting for the $1 million investment—a 50
percent loss. However, these investments take time to pan out, and
initially, shareholders cannot easily tell the difference between the two.
Both cost $1 million and otherwise resemble each other, so
shareholders cannot tell whether managers have invested in the good
project, A, or the bad project, B, until it is too late.

222. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 23, at 805 (explaining the concept of corporate
governance as a spectrum, rather than a binary).
223. The model’s conclusions will not change if shareholders can choose any governance
structure along the spectrum between weak and strong governance. See Goshen & Levit, supra
note 22, at 27–28.
224. See supra Part I.B.3.
225. See, e.g., supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text (discussing how equity majority
owners were unable to remove Zuckerberg due to Facebook’s dual-class structure).
226. For simplicity, we use the two poles of the governance spectrum. However, as
mentioned, the model’s conclusions will not change if shareholders can choose any governance
structure along the spectrum between weak and strong governance. See supra note 223.
227. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 23, at 770 (“When investors exercise control, they
make mistakes due to a lack of expertise, information, or talent, thereby generating principal
competence costs.”).
228. Of course, this represents an uncharitable view of human nature. As will be shown in
the following part, the model will work the same way with any proportion. See infra Part III.B.
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Managers face a third option: do nothing. They can run the
company as usual, make no new investments, and distribute to the
shareholders the $1 million that would otherwise be spent on labor.
While shareholders cannot distinguish between projects A and B, they
can distinguish between a manager who invests and one who
distributes free cash.
Shareholders now must choose between strong and weak
governance given the risk that they will hire a disloyal manager who
will select project B. Shareholders that choose weak governance face a
50 percent chance of disloyalty: If they hire a loyal manager (50 percent
chance), she will invest in project A, generating $500,000 in profits for
the firm. If they hire a disloyal manager (50 percent chance), she will
invest in project B, generating $500,000 in losses. The expected value229
of choosing weak governance, then, is zero.230
If shareholders choose strong governance, however, managers are
unlikely to invest. Disloyal managers will not invest for fear that
shareholders will recognize the investment as project B, while loyal
managers will not invest in project A because shareholders may
misperceive it as project B, thus potentially resulting in termination.231
Instead, managers will distribute the free cash (the $1 million) through
dividends and buybacks rather than investing it.232 On the margin, they
will neither make nor lose money. The expected value of choosing
strong governance, then, is also zero.
Under these conditions, shareholders will be indifferent between
strong and weak governance. Strong governance yields an expected
return of zero because managers will have an incentive not to invest.
Weak governance also produces zero expected returns because a loyal
manager’s potential gains are wiped out by the risk of losses from a

229. Expected value is calculated by multiplying the value of any given outcome by its
probability and totaling the weighted outcomes. So here, $500,000 times 50 percent plus negative
$500,000 times 50 percent is zero. For an explanation of how to calculate expected value, see Will
Kenton, Expected Value (EV), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/expectedvalue.asp [https://perma.cc/7K6P-NLGU], (last updated Mar. 10, 2022).
230. An expected return of zero means an appropriate return to compensate for the risk. The
assumption here is that the expected return on project A provides an appropriate return to
compensate for both the investment risk of project A and the risk of hiring a disloyal manager
who will invest in project B.
231. See Goshen & Levit, supra note 22, at 13 (modeling the possibility that shareholders
“will get the wrong signal” from investments and mistakenly fire a manager).
232. See id. at 12 (showing that as long as they care about their jobs, managers will refrain
from investing in strong-governance corporations).
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disloyal one. Either way, shareholders realize an expected value of zero
and will thus be indifferent between strong- and weak- governance.233
Of course, the indifference here is only due to the assumptions
made: 50 percent loyal managers, with losses and gains that cancel one
another out. The following Sections account for what happens when
these inputs change. The key insight will be that the preferred choice
of governance structure is contingent on market conditions.
B. The Feedback Between Wages and Governance Structure
Previously, we assumed that both investment projects—A and
B—cost $1 million in outlays on labor. Suppose that each project
demands ten employees be hired at $100,000 per employee. Given the
other market conditions, this rate makes strong and weak governance
equivalent in terms of expected return. Suppose, however, that wages
decline to $80,000 per employee. Each investment project will now cost
$800,000 but will still yield the same returns. Project A will yield $1.5
million, and subtracting $800,000 in labor costs leaves a profit of
$700,000 (as opposed to $500,000 before). Project B will yield $500,000,
and subtracting $800,000 in labor costs leaves a loss of $300,000 (as
opposed to $500,000 before).
Shareholders now face a different choice when making decisions
about governance structure. Under strong governance, loyal and
disloyal managers will refrain from investing.234 The expected value of
strong governance, therefore, remains zero. Weak governance,
however, now yields a positive expected value. Shareholders stand a 50
percent chance of making $700,000 with a loyal manager and a 50
percent chance of losing $300,000 with a disloyal manager, for an
expected return of $200,000 in profits. When wages are low, we can
expect that shareholders will prefer weak governance to strong
governance.
At first, this result seems counterintuitive. Typically, shareholders
prize the right to fire and replace corporate managers.235 However,
233. The assumption is that for every level of risk an investment yields the appropriate return
to compensate for that level of risk. In other words, all investments yield market returns (zero net
present). This is true for the current investments already undertaken by strong-governance firms
and for the new investments contemplated by weak-governance firms.
234. See Goshen & Levit, supra note 22, at 12 (showing that in equilibrium managers will
maintain the status quo as long as shareholders have the right to fire them).
235. Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1380
(2017) (“Shareholder advocates, in particular, defend the need for a strong shareholders’ power
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when wages are low, they may wish to tie their own hands through
weak-governance measures, allowing managers to capitalize on
discounted wages without fear of being fired.236 In other words,
manager entrenchment makes good business sense if the goal is to
encourage investment.237
Notice that, under these conditions, shareholders would prefer
weak governance in spite of the management agency costs it generates.
While half of the weak-governance companies will make $700,000 due
to loyal managers investing in project A, the other half will lose
$300,000 from disloyal managers investing in project B. This $300,000
loss represents the management agency costs of weak governance.
However, where investment is particularly attractive—as here, with
discounted wages—weak governance is still preferable to strong
governance due to the outsized gains from investing.238 Thus,
shareholders may want to cede control to encourage managers to make
investments where they otherwise would refrain—even though some
companies will lose money because of management agency costs.
A depressed labor market thus makes governance choices
relevant: weak governance is preferable given low wages. In a
depressed labor market, we expect shareholders in at least some
strong-governance companies to switch to weak governance so that
their managers have the freedom to invest. As the number of weakgovernance companies rises, investment levels will increase, pushing
up wages. Firms will continue to move to weak governance until wages
rise to $100,000 per employee, where, as shown above, weak and strong
governance have the same expected value. Once wages reach this rate,
firms will once again be indifferent between weak and strong
of removal—exercisable virtually at any time—in order to ensure that the exercise of this power
(or even just the threat of it) can serve an effective disciplinary function.”).
236. See, e.g., Valentin Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of Common
Stock into Dual-Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 342, 342 (2006)
(studying “a sample of 178 firms that changed from a one-share-one-vote” (strong governance)
“into a dual-class common stock structure” (weak governance) during 1979–1998, and finding that
dual-class recapitalizations are shareholder value enhancing corporate initiatives).
237. Raymond J. Fisman, Rakesh Khurana, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & Soojin Yim,
Governance and CEO Turnover: Do Something or Do the Right Thing?, 60 MGMT. SCI. 319, 320–
21 (2014) (presenting a model that suggests some level of boards entrenchment may be optimal,
as it protects CEOs from bad firing decisions by shareholders).
238. Dimitrov & Jain, supra note 236 (finding that upon a switch from one-share-one-vote to
dual-class, shareholders, on average, earn significant positive abnormal returns and that these
returns are even larger for firms that issue equity—a clear indication of engaging in substantial
investments).
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governance, and they will stop switching. In other words, they will have
reached a new equilibrium, this time with more weak-governance
firms.239
Conversely, strong governance is preferable when wages are high.
Suppose that wages rise to $120,000 per employee, for an aggregate
labor cost of $1.2 million for each project. Now, the potential profits
and losses will flip: project A yields only $300,000 in profits while
project B yields $700,000 in losses on average. While the expected
return of strong governance remains zero, as above, the expected
return of weak governance is now $200,000 in losses. In this market,
strong governance is preferable. Thus, weak-governance firms will
switch to strong governance, causing investment levels, hiring, and,
consequently, wages to fall.240 Firms will continue to switch, and labor
prices will continue to decrease until wages fall to $100,000 per
employee, making shareholders once again indifferent between strong
and weak governance. At this point, there will be more stronggovernance companies than before, but both governance structures
will yield the same expected value. This is the feedback loop between
wages and governance structures.
In equilibrium, then, shareholders will be indifferent between
weak and strong governance. The same can be said of the distribution
between loyal and disloyal managers: shareholders will adjust until
they are indifferent between governance structures. For instance,
assume that 70 percent of managers are loyal, 30 percent are disloyal
(as opposed to fifty-fifty before), and the wage level is $100,000 per
employee. Under these conditions, weak governance will be more
profitable: 70 percent of managers (the loyal ones) will invest in project
A and make $500,000 in profit, while 30 percent (the disloyal ones) will
invest in project B and lose $500,000. The expected profit of weak
governance would then be $200,000, while the expected value of strong
governance remains zero. Companies would switch to weak

239. See Goshen & Levit, supra note 22, at 15 (“Essentially, the irrelevance is obtained
because in equilibrium market clearing requires the price of resources to be fair in the sense that
a change to the status quo is a zero net present value (NPV) investment from the shareholders’
perspective.”).
240. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach & Anete Pajuste, The Life-Cycle of
Dual Class Firm Valuation 42 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 550/2018, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062895 [https://perma.cc/GXD6-5PXJ] (finding that 20 percent of
dual-class firms (weak governance) unify their shares (strong governance) and experience
increase in value).
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governance, pushing up wages. Wages would once again rise until they
cancel out any gains from weak governance. Thus, in a world with a
higher proportion of loyal managers, we can expect that there will be
more weak-governance corporations, but the expected value of both
governance structures will be the same.241
In short, just as wages impact the choice of governance structure,
governance structure impacts wage rates. Strong governance
discourages investment, whereas weak governance incentivizes it.
Investment requires labor to build factories, launch divisions, open
stores, build supply chains, and conduct research.242 Thus, if many
companies move toward weak governance, investment and hiring will
rise, pushing up wages. Conversely, if many firms switch to strong
governance, investments will fall, and wages along with it. These
symmetrical forces push wages to a competitive level.
C. The Competitive Equilibrium and Its Parameters
The stylized model illustrates that governance structure and labor
prices will reach an equilibrium where shareholders are indifferent as
to governance structure. In this equilibrium, weak- and stronggovernance companies will coexist, with none gaining the upper hand
by switching from one governance structure to another. Because this
equilibrium reflects a labor price determined through competition
among hiring firms—where none of the players, corporations,
shareholders, and employees, enjoy market power—it maximizes
social welfare reflected in the distribution of wealth between labor and
capital.243
To be sure, this equilibrium imposes certain inefficiencies on
corporations and their shareholders because some proportion of firms
will adopt weak governance.244 Returning to the model where 50
241. For instance, one could set the prior probability that a manager is disloyal equal to a
generic variable between zero and one and obtain the irrelevance result regardless. See Goshen
& Levit, supra note 22, at 8–9.
242. For example, labor costs amount to 13 percent of the revenue of S&P 500 companies.
Connor Smith, Higher Pay Is a Rising Threat to Stocks, Goldman Sachs Says, BARRON’S (July 10,
2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/higher-pay-is-a-rising-threat-to-stocksgoldman-sachs-says-51562752800 [https://perma.cc/GN4R-HUJQ].
243. See Berger et al., supra note 220, at 43 (concluding that households are worse off in an
anticompetitive labor market where firms wield market power than in a competitive labor
market).
244. See, e.g., Kevin C.W. Chen, Zhihong Chen & K.C. John Wei, Agency Costs of Free Cash
Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital, 46 J. FIN. &
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percent of firms had weak-governance structures and 50 percent of
managers were disloyal, probabilistically, twenty-five firms would hire
disloyal managers who will destroy value by investing in pet projects
(project B). In this case, $500,000 in losses per firm at twenty-five firms
would total $12.5 million in management agency costs. However,
strong governance is also costly. Keeping with the same example, loyal
managers in twenty-five strong-governance firms will not invest in
project A, forgoing a $500,000 in profits per firm, for a total of $12.5
million in “principal costs” (the loss due to shareholders’ inability to
accurately distinguish between projects A and B).245
These costs to shareholders are unavoidable in a competitive
equilibrium. If shareholders could avoid management agency costs by
switching to strong governance only in the firms with disloyal
managers, they could prevent those managers from making outlays on
labor. In other words, disloyal managers—twenty-five in our
example—invest in pet projects when shareholders would prefer that
they do not invest at all. This investment represents a benefit to
workers, as it increases hiring and bolsters wages. Because
shareholders cannot preempt only disloyal managers, corporations
spend more on labor than their owners would prefer.246
While this balance is not optimal from the shareholders’ point of
view, from a social perspective, it represents a competitive allocation
of wealth between labor and capital. Importantly, the equilibrium with
higher social welfare includes some level of inefficient management
agency costs.247 But, as long as shareholders cannot accurately identify
management’s loyalty, management agency costs can only be reduced
by creating a greater detriment to some other group of stakeholders.248
That is, even though this equilibrium is not optimal for shareholders, it
is efficient overall.
So far, this Part has demonstrated that labor prices and
governance structure will counterbalance one another to reach a
competitive equilibrium in the absence of common owners. The

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 171, 200 (2011) (concluding that firms that employ takeover
defenses—a weak-governance measure—experience higher costs of equity capital).
245. See generally Goshen & Squire, supra note 23 (developing the principal-cost theory).
246. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 23, at 565–67 (outlining the information and
competence problems that prevent shareholders from being perfect arbiters of managerial
effectiveness and loyalty).
247. See Goshen & Levit, supra note 22, at 18 (showing mathematically that a competitive
equilibrium of control rights maximizes social welfare).
248. Id.
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following Section describes how common owners alter this balance by
increasing the number of strong-governance companies, resulting in a
new and less efficient equilibrium.
D. Breaking the Competitive Governance Equilibrium
Common owners and the push for strong governance represent a
departure from the equilibrium described in the economic model
above, where governance structure and wages interact in a competitive
market. With competition, the number of strong-governance
companies is determined by the prevailing market wage. However,
common owners push for strong governance regardless of market
wages. As a result, the number of companies adhering to either
governance structure is determined not by competition but by the
governance preferences of a handful of asset managers.
Recall that we assumed the market contained fifty stronggovernance and fifty weak-governance firms, and half of the potential
managers were disloyal. None of the players had the market power to
change the equilibrium unilaterally.249 As demonstrated, labor prices
reach a level such that no firm can boost profits by switching from weak
to strong governance or vice versa.250
Now assume that a handful of common owners hold large stakes
in each of the one hundred companies in the model,251 and due to their
pressure, twenty firms switch from weak to strong governance.252 From
fifty-fifty, then, the market will now consist of seventy stronggovernance and thirty weak-governance firms.
Before, managers could choose to invest in project A and project
B, either creating or destroying $500,000 in value, such that the
expected value of weak governance after labor costs was zero.
However, as common owners switch more firms to strong governance,
investments will fall and the labor market will slacken, causing wages
to decrease. Suppose that now each employee costs $80,000 instead of
$100,000, for an aggregate labor cost of $800,000 for either project.
249. Id. at 5.
250. Id.
251. The number of common owners is irrelevant for our purposes. However, if we were to
set the number at three, for instance, it would be a good approximation of the U.S. equity markets.
Recall that three firms, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, together form the largest
stockholder in nine out of ten S&P 500 companies. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
252. This is not an unrealistic assumption: common owners tend to endorse shareholder
rights for their portfolio companies regardless of market conditions. See supra Part I.B.
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Strong governance continues to net an expected value of zero since
managers will refrain from investing. However, weak governance will
now yield an expected return of $200,000 in profits.253
In a competitive market, shareholders would adjust to these
abnormal returns by switching their companies to weak governance to
take advantage of low wages, eventually pushing wages back up to
equilibrium.254 However, in this new market dominated by common
owners, shareholders prefer strong governance in spite of the wage
rate. Regardless of the expected abnormal returns to any one firm from
weak governance, common owners will oppose any move in that
direction, meaning that wages will remain consistently low. In effect,
common owners have deactivated the market mechanism—that is, the
choice of governance structure—that previously corrected any
imbalance in the labor market.255 Therefore, common owners will have
created a new equilibrium with lower investment and lower wages—in
other words, a labor market monopsony.256

253. Half the time, the weak-governance companies will hire a disloyal manager who invests
in project B for a gross return of $500,000, netting a loss of $300,000. The other half of the weakgovernance companies, headed by loyal managers, will make a gross return of $1.5 million, for a
net profit of $700,000. Thus, the expected value of choosing weak governance is a gain of $200,000.
254. See Goshen & Levit, supra note 22, at 4–5.
255. Like in any cartelized market the abnormal returns will attract new entries which the
cartel will need to block. Indeed, while dual-class IPOs were on average 4.59 percent of total IPOs
in the years 1980–1989, they increased to 8 percent in the years 1990–1999, to 9.3 percent in the
years 2000–2009, and they reached 16.9 percent in the years 2010–2019. Calculated based on Jay
R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics, WARRINGTON COLL. OF BUS., UNIV. OF
FLA. 67 tbl.23, https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPO-Statistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y2SL-TYME], (last updated Dec. 23, 2021). Not surprisingly, institutional investors declared a
war on dual-class IPOs. See Goshen & Hannes, supra note 80, at 281–82. For a different
explanation for the rise of dual-class IPOs, see Aggarwal et al., supra note 175, at 122 (finding
that “the increasing popularity of dual-class structures is driven by founder-controlled firms” and
the “increase in founder control over time is due to greater availability of private capital and
technological shocks that reduced firms’ needs for external financing”).
256. Importantly, although our model is framed in terms of firms adopting either weak
governance or strong governance, the model’s conclusions are valid even if firms can choose
governance structures along a spectrum. Assume governance can range from weak to strong along
a spectrum, according to the level of managerial freedom to invest. On the limited managerial
freedom end, investment is zero, and on the unlimited managerial freedom end, investment is at
its maximum. In this structure, firms can adopt any governance on the spectrum, with the
corresponding level of investment. For instance, if a firm is on the middle of the spectrum, its
manager will invest half of the maximum investment. In such a case, if all firms increase the
strength of their corporate governance, the aggregate level of investment will decrease, and each
firm will increase its profitability on the investments it is still making. In short, the monopsony
effect will work the same way.
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The model above predicts that when the dust settles on this new
world of common ownership, there will be more strong-governance
firms, a lower level of investment, and lower wages. Strong-governance
firms will reduce their investment level while weak-governance firms
will continue investing unconstrained. Both types will now enjoy a
substantial labor discount: strong-governance firms on their lower level
of investment and weak-governance firms on their higher level of
investment. Because common owners own a market portfolio, they
enjoy the extra profits accrued by both types of firms. Notably, despite
the abnormally positive investment returns, strong-governance firms
will still reduce their investments while enjoying the benefit of
depressed labor prices only on their remaining investments.257
In our model, for simplicity, strong-governance firms do not invest
but lose nothing on their existing operation (that is, we assumed away
the extra profits on their lower level of investment). However, the
remaining thirty weak-governance firms in this economy will now
benefit from anticompetitive wages. Each firm will net, on average, an
extra $200,000, or an extra $6 million in the aggregate. Because
common owners hold a stake in each company, their portfolio values
will rise as the weak-governance firms become more profitable and the
strong-governance firms lose nothing. This money did not appear out
of thin air but rather came out of workers’ paychecks: it represents a
$6 million subsidy from workers to the shareholders of the companies
that employ them. It is a $6 million transfer from the lower and middle
classes to the rich.

257. The abnormal profitability implies that there will be incentives for firms to go private or
stay private and avoid the public market in order to enjoy the abnormal profitability from
investments. Indeed, these two phenomena are empirically documented. See generally MICHAEL
J. MAUBOUSSIN, DAN CALLAHAN & DARIUS MAJD, CREDIT SUISSE, THE INCREDIBLE
SHRINKING UNIVERSE OF STOCKS: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FEWER U.S. EQUITIES
(2017), https://www.cmgwealth.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/document_1072753661.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WYV-VFC2] (providing the data on the growth of the private market); John
Asker, Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, Corporate Investment and Stock Market
Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342, 342 (2015) (finding that “compared with private firms,
public firms invest substantially less and are less responsive to changes in investment
opportunities”); Ofer Eldar & Jillian Grennan, Common Ownership and Entrepreneurship, 111
AEA PAPERS & PROC. 582, 582 (finding that common ownership is forming in the private market
to pose competition to the common ownership anticompetitive effects in the public market as
“common ownership of start-ups in the same industry is nowadays the norm”). Given the
empirical findings that investment levels are still low, it is reasonable to assume that there are
frictions in the private market that prevent this market from returning the economy to the
competitive equilibrium.
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Worse yet, this transfer of wealth to shareholders will also inflict a
deadweight loss on society: the twenty firms that switched from weak
to strong governance will reduce investment and thus will not employ
two hundred employees.258 The severity of the deadweight loss depends
on the alternative employment of these employees. If ten employees
stay unemployed, the loss would be $1 million (10 x $100,000).
Alternatively, if all employees find employment but with a $10,000
lower annual salary, the deadweight loss would be $2 million (200 x
$10,000). That is, the cost of transferring $6 million to shareholders
includes an additional substantial deadweight loss. By shifting value
from the labor market to the capital market, common owners create a
new, less efficient equilibrium that reduces aggregate social welfare in
the economy at large.259
Notably, common owners have expropriated value from the labor
market without resorting to any collusion. Instead, the monopsony
results from shareholders behaving as they otherwise would: firing
disloyal managers, as they perceive them, and retaining loyal ones.
However, because of the increased number of strong-governance
firms, this everyday behavior results in underinvestment relative to a
competitive market and thus lower wages.
Essentially, common owners have externalized some of their
management agency costs to employees. Management agency costs are
minimized because fewer disloyal managers are investing in inefficient
projects, and the loss from these inefficient projects is smaller, given
the labor discount. Moreover, the efficient investments of the
remaining loyal managers will be disproportionately profitable. By
cutting these management agency costs, common owners have made
the market work more efficiently for them—but less efficiently for
everyone else.
E. Common Ownership Monopsony Compared to Other
Explanations
Thus far, this Part has explained how common owners operate to
create a labor monopsony and shift wealth from labor to capital. This

258. In the basic setup of the model, we assumed that both investment projects—A and B—
cost $1 million in outlays on labor, and that each project demands ten employees be hired at
$100,000 per employee. When twenty firms do not invest, two hundred employees are not hired
(twenty firms times ten employees).
259. See Goshen & Levit, supra note 22, at 17–19 (showing that “any deviation from the
competitive allocation is socially inefficient”).
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Section examines some of the alternative explanations for
macroeconomic trends such as wage stagnation and increased
economic inequality and shows how common ownership either
supplants or complements these alternatives.
1. Product Monopolies.
Emerging literature attributes
anticompetitive effects to common owners by suggesting that they
reduce competition in the product markets rather than labor markets.260
To be sure, this theory would also explain the declining investment and
stagnant wages: by decreasing output in order to raise prices of
products, common owners would also incidentally reduce investment,
hiring, and wages. Monopsony and monopoly, after all, “are two sides
of the same coin, and both harm labor and product markets.”261
Because common owners hold stakes in competing corporations, they
could theoretically benefit by incentivizing their portfolio companies
to raise consumer prices by not competing with one another.262 For
instance, economists have noted anticompetitive effects of common
ownership on the prices of airline tickets.263
However, the monopoly theory faces a key limitation not shared
by the monopsony theory: it requires common owners to take explicit
or implicit steps to facilitate a monopoly in the product markets. In
other words, the monopoly theory contends that household names,
such as BlackRock and Vanguard, incentivize firms to raise prices. So
far, scholars have not provided convincing evidence that such
systematic anticompetitive behavior exists,264 and absent this evidence,

260. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 39, at 1401–09 (outlining the theories regarding the
anticompetitive effects of common ownership and reviewing the evidence supporting them).
261. Naidu et al., supra note 148, at 559.
262. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 39, at 1402–03 (describing how common owners
stand to gain by discouraging portfolio companies from competing with one another).
263. See Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 15, at 1518. This study has been
strongly challenged. See, e.g., Patrick J. Dennis, Kristopher Gerardi & Carola Schenone, Common
Ownership Does Not Have Anti-Competitive Effects in the Airline Industry, J. FIN. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3063465 [https://perma.cc/5WT5-L4BA] (“We
show that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and ticket prices
stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the
ownership and control components.”); Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 39, at 1397–98 (describing
how the airline study has been subject to scrutiny). And for counterarguments to these challenges,
see generally Einer Elhauge, How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy—And Why
Antitrust Law Can Fix It, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 207 (2020).
264. See, e.g., Erik P. Gilje, Todd A. Gormley & Doron Levit, Who’s Paying Attention?
Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 152,
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it is difficult to believe those common owners could rig the product
markets for four decades without attracting notice.
By contrast, the monopsony theory explains wage stagnation and
income inequality without pointing to collusion. This Article contends
that common owners create a labor monopsony by doing what they
always do: pushing for strong governance and disciplining disloyal or
incompetent managers. Contrary to common wisdom, strong
governance is not the benefit of common ownership against which we
must weigh their anticompetitive costs (less competition in the product
market). Rather, the costs and benefits of common ownership are both
generated by institutional investors’ policy of pushing public
corporations to adopt strong governance (reducing agency costs while
creating labor monopsony).
Viewed in this light, it is clear that the monopsony effect does not
share the monopoly theory’s limitations. Common owners increase
shareholder profits at the expense of other stakeholders not through
illegal coordination in the pricing of products (output) but through
strong governance resulting in monopsony pricing of labor (input).

152 (2020) (showing that properly measured, common ownership does not affect managers’
incentives to consider employing anticompetitive devices because common owners are
inattentive); Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 39, at 1410–19 (providing a comprehensive challenge
and criticism of the studies suggesting anticompetitive behavior by common owners); Edward
Rock & Daniel Rubinfeld, Does Common Ownership Explain Higher Oligopolistic Profits? 1
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 528/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3627474 [https://perma.cc/XC8A-KUDP] (criticizing the anticompetitive monopolies
claim and offering alternative explanations for the data); John Morley, Too Big To Be Activist, 92
S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (2019) (explaining why large institutional investors cannot be activists);
Thomas A. Lambert & Michael E. Sykuta, The Case for Doing Nothing About Institutional
Investors’ Common Ownership of Small Stakes in Competing Firms 0 (Univ. Mo. Sch. L., Legal
Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 2018-21, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173787 [https://perma.cc/RV3FPULA] (criticizing the studies claiming that common ownership leads to anticompetitive
monopolies); Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82
ANTITRUST L.J. 221, 223 (2018) (criticizing the economic analysis and findings of the
anticompetitive monopolies claim); Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive
Effects of Common Ownership: We Know Less Than We Think 2–3 (Feb. 22, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2922677 [https://perma.cc/KH54-JHWV] (“[T]he
emerging research at present does not scientifically establish that an increase in common
ownership involving minority shareholdings causes higher prices in the industries examined.”).
For a conflicting view, see generally Einer Elhauge, The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal
Shareholding, 82 OHIO STATE L.J. 1 (2021).
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2. Shareholder Primacy. The shift to shareholder primacy has
been blamed for increasing income inequality.265 The argument is that
as managers started to maximize shareholders’ value, they were doing
so at the expense of other stakeholders, such as employees.266 Indeed,
today “shareholders versus stakeholders” is at the center of academic
debate, with many arguing in favor of shifting corporations back to
maximizing stakeholders’ value.267
While shareholder primacy is a contributing factor to the rise of
strong governance,268 it cannot explain income inequality in itself. At
the level of an individual firm, no amount of attention lavished on
shareholders could transfer wealth away from other stakeholders in a
competitive market. Where wages are determined by competition
among rival employers, even the most zealous efforts by management
could not lower those wages in the interest of enriching shareholders.
Only by incapacitating the feedback loop between wages and corporate
governance in most firms have common owners been able to transfer
value from employees to shareholders. Shareholder primacy alone
cannot explain these trends.
3. Classic Labor Monopsony. Commonly, the theory of labor
monopsony focuses on firms’ market power over labor—that is, on the
265. See, e.g., Ezra Wasserman Mitchell, Corporate Governance and Income Inequality: The
Role of the Monitoring Board, 3 BUS. & FIN. L. REV. 49, 49 (2019) (blaming the monitoring board
which enforces shareholder primacy); Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate
Structure, 45 STETSON L. REV. 69, 70 (2015) (blaming inequality on shareholder primacy).
266. For more on this position, see generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali & Oluwatomi
O. Williams, Lifting Labor’s Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and Power
Within American Corporate Governance, 106 MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2022); Leo Strine & Kirby
Smith, Toward Fair Gainsharing and a Quality Workplace for Employees: How a Reconceived
Compensation Committee Might Help Make Corporations More Responsible Employers and
Restore Faith in American Capitalism, 76 BUS. LAW. 31 (2020/2021); Leo Strine, Toward Fair and
Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal to Help American Workers, Restore Fair
Gainsharing between Employees and Shareholders, and Increase American Competitiveness by
Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth and
Encouraging Investments in America’s Future (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper
No. 19-39, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3461924 [https://perma.cc/T3UL-KL7E]; Leo Strine,
Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and
Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870 (2017).
267. See generally, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of
Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2020) (presenting the stakeholderism
arguments and rejecting them).
268. See supra Part I.B.2; Falato et al., supra note 32, at 2 (“Shareholders with large and
concentrated ownership . . . can more easily monitor managers and force them to fire workers or
cut payroll against their will . . . .”).
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relative bargaining power of firms versus employees and the factors
affecting it.269 However, this focus does not conflict with the
explanation offered by the common ownership monopsony theory.
a. Market Concentration. A firm’s market power is commonly achieved
through market concentration, either in a geographic area, a
production technology, or the product market.270 When the employee’s
bargaining power is low, the firm can offer a lower salary. For instance,
imagine a geographic area where there used to be ten factories, and
now there are only two.271 As the competition among factories over
employees in an area decreases, so does the employee’s bargaining
power. Although this theory potentially explains wage stagnation and
income inequality, studies increasingly challenge the empirical
evidence of labor market concentration.272
By contrast, this Article contends that the monopsony is driven by
shareholders’ market power, not firms’ market power. Thus, firms’
geographic or product market concentration is unnecessary for the
labor monopsony to work. Indeed, common ownership has the greatest

269. See generally, e.g., Orley C. Ashenfelter, Henry Farber & Michael R Ransom, Labor
Market Monopsony, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 203 (2010) (explaining the theories of labor market
monopsony).
270. See generally, e.g., Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration, supra note 8, at S169
(finding geographic concentration in labor markets throughout the United States “consistent with
labor market concentration creating labor market power”); Efraim Benmelech, Nittai K.
Bergman & Hyunseob Kim, Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer
Concentration Affect Wages?, 57 J. HUM. RES. S200 (2022) (exploring the sources of firms’ market
power over labor).
271. Thus, mergers have been a major focus as the driving force behind concentration that
leads to labor monopsony. See generally, e.g., David Arnold, Mergers and Acquisitions, Local
Labor Market Concentration, and Worker Outcomes (Jan. 21, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3476369 [https://perma.cc/T4SX-AL52] (finding that mergers
that increase concentration also decrease wages).
272. See, e.g., Brad Hershbein, Claudia Macaluso & Chen Yeh, Concentration in U.S. Local
Labor Markets: Evidence from Vacancy and Employment Data 33 (Soc’y for Econ. Dynamics,
Working Paper No. 1336, 2019), https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2019/paper_1336.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HY66-XSBA] (finding that in the last decade, at most 5 percent of new U.S. jobs
are in moderately concentrated local markets and that local labor market concentration has
decreased by at least 25 percent since 1976). See generally, e.g., Kevin Rinz, Labor Market
Concentration, Earnings, and Inequality, 57 J. HUM. RES. S251 (2022) (finding that local industrial
concentration has generally been declining from 1976 to 2016); Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, PierreDaniel Sarte & Nicholas Trachter, Diverging Trends in National and Local Concentration, 35
NBER MACROECON. ANN. 115 (2021) (finding that local labor market concentration is falling in
the U.S. economy).
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effect of lowering investments in industries that are less concentrated
at the firm level.273
b. De-unionization. Another source of firms’ increased market power
over employees is the de-unionization of the U.S. labor market.
Collective bargaining increases employees’ market power, allowing
them to receive competitive salaries according to their productivity.274
Moreover, strong unions also have a spillover effect on other nonunion
firms, forcing them to increase wages as well. However, the percentage
of employees represented by unions fell rapidly in the 1980s and
continued to fall in the 1990s and the early 2000s.275 The falling rate of
unionization, and the decreased spillover effect that followed, have
contributed to lower wages.
This theory’s critics ascribe the decline in workers’ power not to
the de-unionization itself but to parallel trends that separately eroded
the unions’ bargaining power, such as global trade pressures, the shift
to services, and ongoing technological change.276 In that vein, our
theory can add another trend affecting the bargaining power during the
same period. Powerful institutional investors shifting firms to strong
governance and shareholder primacy changed labor negotiation
dynamics—employers took a militant stance against unions and
employees.277 Notably, this may be because the market is less
competitive: when there are fewer investments, employees have less
bargaining power in the first place.
c. Globalization and Immigration. Employees’ bargaining power also
decreases when they compete with a greater number of other
employees: the greater the number of employees, the lower the wages.
Competition with employees from other countries can take the form of
either production moving to another country278 or employees moving
273. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, Ownership, Concentration, and Investment, supra note 156,
at 434 (finding that common ownership has a substantial effect on industries that appear
competitive according to traditional measures).
274. See generally, e.g., Farber et al., supra note 5 (finding consistent evidence that unions
reduce inequality).
275. See, e.g., MISHEL, supra note 5, at 2.
276. See id.
277. See id.; Stansbury & Summers, supra note 192, at 2–3 (defining the decrease in “worker
power” as the product of de-unionization and changes in corporate ownership).
278. See generally, e.g., Jonathan Haskel, Robert Z. Lawrence, Edward E. Leamer &
Matthew J. Slaughter, Globalization and U.S. Wages: Modifying Classic Theory To Explain
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to the United States.279 While immigration cannot explain the decrease
in investments and the lower percentage of employees working in
public corporations, globalization can. However, a study of the causes
of decreased investments assigned a low explanatory power to
globalization.280 These trends may be a parallel cause of wage
stagnation, along with common ownership.
d. Technology. Technology affects labor in two related ways. First, it
displaces some employees (via automation and robots).281 Second, it
differentiates between employees—educated employees who can
produce or operate technology (and get high salaries and equity) and
employees who cannot (and get stagnant wages).282 Studies have found
that technology can explain about a third of the effects on labor.283 The
common ownership monopsony theory aims to explain the other twothirds.
In sum, while other theories may hold some purchase, common
ownership monopsony greatly contributes to some of the more
troubling macroeconomic trends of this day and age. The detrimental
effect of common ownership on labor markets and the economy
requires a rethinking of how the law treats common owners and strong
governance. The following Part begins to analyze the policy
implications of the monopsony effect.
IV. REVERSING THE MONOPSONY EFFECT: BREAK UP BLACKROCK
Given the inherent tradeoff of strong governance—reducing
management agency costs while creating a labor monopsony—
policymakers face a dilemma. Should they side with employees or
shareholders? If shareholders’ interests are the primary concern,
Recent Facts, 26 J. ECON. PERSPS. 119 (2012) (reviewing “how globalization might explain the
recent trends in real and relative wages in the United States”).
279. See generally George Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping:
Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1335 (2003)
(estimating the labor market impact of immigration).
280. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, Investmentless Growth, supra note 11, at 147 (“[T]he decline
in U.S. investment is not (entirely) explained by rising globalization.”).
281. See generally, e.g., Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 9 (showing that automation may
reduce employment and wages).
282. See generally, e.g., Lankisch et al., supra note 9 (finding that automation contributes to
rising inequality).
283. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, Ownership, Concentration, and Investment, supra note 156
(“[W]e argue that rising intangibles accounts for a quarter to a third of the [investment] gap.”).
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nothing should be done. Common owners’ power will continue to
grow, and with it, the destructive effects of strong governance. If the
interests of employees are the primary concern, however, policymakers
should act.
Policymakers should eliminate the monopsony effect by
increasing the number of market players. Fragmenting the market
reduces each individual player’s influence—thereby shifting the
balance back toward weak governance and managerial freedom.284
That is, to solve the problems caused by common ownership, the
answer is to break up common owners.
At present, Congress, to all appearances, does not have the
political will to break up common owners, as institutional investors
have effectively “captured” Congress through political spending. Since
the 2008 financial crisis, institutional investors have drastically ramped
up both their campaign contributions285 and lobbying expenditures,286

284. See, e.g., José Azar & Xavier Vives, Oligopoly, Macroeconomic Performance, and
Competition Policy 4 (Dec. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract_id=3177079 [https://perma.cc/P5CB-8FCM] (“[I]ncreased market concentration—due
either to fewer firms or to more common ownership—depresses the economy by reducing
employment, output, real wages, and the labor share . . . .”). A small but growing literature has
begun to examine the effect of oligopolistic (and, by the same token, oligopsonistic) control of
the capital markets. Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and
Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2032 (2018) (“[S]hareholding by a small number of
institutional investors is causally linked with reduced output and higher prices.”). To be sure,
however, the idea that concentration of ownership has negative economic effects still draws fierce
criticism. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Why Common Ownership Is Not an Antitrust Problem,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 4, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/
12/04/why-common-ownership-is-not-an-antitrust-problem [https://perma.cc/UY7X-96XL] (“[T]he
current empirical evidence that common ownership causes anticompetitive harm is limited and
hotly disputed.”).
285. Compare Securities & Investment: Money to Congress, OPENSECRETS, https://
www.opensecrets.org/industries/
summary.php?ind=F07&recipdetail=A&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2006 [https://perma.cc/
XN3E-8VAD] (showing that institutional investors spent approximately $50 million on campaign
contributions in the 2006 election cycle), with Securities & Investment: Money to Congress,
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary.php?ind=F07&recipdetail=A&
sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2012 [https://perma.cc/34YZ-G8PA] (showing approximately $104
million in the 2012 election cycle), and Securities & Investment: Money to Congress,
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary.php?ind=F07&recipdetail=A&
sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2020 [https://perma.cc/S4TP-2GAK] (showing approximately $154
million in the 2020 election cycle).
286. See Securities & Investment: Lobbying, 2021, OPENSECRETS, https://
www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2006&ind=F07 [https://perma.cc/MWM8VX5N] (showing that institutional investors spent approximately $65 million on lobbying efforts
in 2006, compared with approximately $106 million in 2010 and $105 million in 2020).
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with a particular focus on members of congressional finance
committees.287 In exchange, institutional investors seem to have bought
themselves the servility of congressional decisionmakers, who have
stood up for them against regulating agencies.288 It is therefore difficult
to imagine that efforts to break up institutional investors would be
successful.
Nevertheless, one can hope that with the Biden administration’s
commitment to extending antitrust policy to “promote the interests of
American workers,”289 including breaking up big tech behemoths,290
and both parties’ attention shifting to the hitherto neglected middle
class, Congress can find common cause in arresting the decline of the
American worker by breaking up common owners.291 This Article,
therefore, presents the breakup alternative and its expected effects.292
Part IV.A outlines the restriction on AUM in order to limit the
monopsony effect. Part IV.B shows how breaking up multitrilliondollar asset managers will affect the relationship between shareholders
and management, thereby increasing managerial freedom. Part IV.C
concludes that these changes would disrupt the monopsony effect by
tipping the market away from strong governance and restoring the
competitive
equilibrium.
Finally,
Part
IV.D
addresses
counterarguments.
A. Break Up BlackRock
The small group of common owners that control the vast majority
of publicly traded corporations prevents any move toward weak
287. See CAMPAIGN FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, BLACKROCK’S WASHINGTON PLAYBOOK:
HOW THE WORLD’S LARGEST ASSET MANAGER BOOSTED ITS POLITICAL SPENDING AND
FOUGHT OFF GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION 4 (2019), https://campaignforaccountability.org/work/
blackrocks-washington-playbook [https://perma.cc/3PZL-5SKK] (“Unsurprisingly, BlackRock
contributed most of its money to members of Congress who sat on committees with jurisdiction
over the company.”).
288. See id. at 6–7 (recounting how two senators who had received large donations from
BlackRock questioned Treasury Department officials about a report finding they were “by far
the largest asset manager in the country,” which “represented a major threat to their business
model”).
289. See Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 14, 2021).
290. See Teachout, supra note 50.
291. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 51 (“The battle for the working class is even more urgent for
the two parties because it’s a growing bloc of voters.”).
292. We are not the first to suggest that antitrust law could be applied to common owners.
See, e.g., Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 67, at 1301–16 (suggesting antitrust
prosecution as a solution). However, this Article is the first to suggest capping AUM as a solution
to the ills of common ownership.
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governance—even though it would be profitable for individual firms.
Capping the AUM that any one firm can manage would require the
breakup of large common owners into smaller owners, limiting the
extent to which they can influence the governance structure of
portfolio firms. Corporations would have the freedom and incentive to
shift back to weak-governance regimes, thereby disrupting the
monopsony effect.
In other words, policymakers should limit common owners’ power
by reducing their size, as power is the crucial variable. For example,
even under dispersed ownership—with millions of small, diversified
shareholders—each diversified investor would benefit from increased
returns resulting from the monopsony effect. However, such small
shareholders do not have the power to push corporations to adopt
strong governance. In other words, portfolio diversification creates the
incentive to push for stronger governance, but it is size that provides
the power to achieve it. Without that power, the monopsony effect is
impossible.
Limiting the AUM of any one institution would force large asset
managers to break up into smaller ones. For example, capping the
AUM of asset managers at a half-trillion dollars would require
BlackRock—which holds over $8 trillion in AUM293—to break up into
fifteen different fund families and State Street, Fidelity, and Vanguard
to split into an additional twenty-five fund families.294 With a smaller
AUM, no single fund or group of funds could gain dominance over the
entire market.295 A fund might attain a common owner’s status but
could no longer act as the type of powerful common owner that has led
to the monopsony effect.296
The particular amount at which to cap AUM should take into
account the minimum size to achieve economies of scale in investing—

293. See About BlackRock, supra note 64.
294. See supra note 64.
295. The sum of all U.S. public equities (all the companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange plus the NASDAQ and OQTQX Market) is valued at about $53 trillion. Total Market
Value of the U.S. Stock Market, SIBLIS RSCH., https://siblisresearch.com/data/us-stock-marketvalue [https://perma.cc/3SFX-3WLT].
296. Investors of a certain absolute size are mathematically able to capture significant shares
in every firm, allowing them to influence governance decisions across the board. See supra Part
I.A–B. Hence, under a breakup, asset managers could become common owners but might not
have the same influence over the whole market.
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an investigation beyond the scope of this Article.297 However, the fact
that the median AUM of the top five hundred asset managers globally
is below $50 billion298 suggests that AUM does not need to be in the
trillions to achieve economies of scale. For the sake of discussion, halfa-trillion is a convenient number—but clearly, as the cap decreases, the
number of players in the stock markets increases.299 To maintain the
same relative size over time, the AUM cap could also be indexed to the
increases in the value of the stock market as a whole.300 While the
appropriate cap needs further study, the monopsony effect
demonstrates that over the last four decades, the balance has tipped
toward too few powerful owners. Thus, moving toward more, smaller
owners—as regulations have historically sought301—would reduce
labor market monopsony.302
297. For a small cross-section of the scholarly discussion on this topic, see, for example,
Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 729 (2019);
Patrick Jahnke, Ownership Concentration and Institutional Investors’ Governance Through Voice
and Exit, 21 BUS. & POL. 327, 335 (2019); Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV.
17, 26 (2019).
298. BOB COLLIE, MARISA HALL, TIM HODGSON, ROGER URWIN & LIANG YIN, THINKING
AHEAD INST., THE WORLD’S LARGEST 500 ASSET MANAGERS 11 (2019), https://
www.thinkingaheadinstitute.org/content/uploads/2020/11/PI500_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q5R9HSN].
299. For instance, the breakup of AT&T in 1984 resulted in a number of smaller, leaner
“Baby Bells” coming into existence. See George B. Shepherd, Joanna M. Shepherd & William G.
Shepherd, Antitrust and Market Dominance, ANTITRUST BULL., Winter 2001, at 860.
300. For an explanation of the relationship between firm size and market concentration, see,
for example, Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 266 (2017).
301. Roe, supra note 55, at 11 (explaining that politicians have generally responded to
Americans’ mistrust of large powerful financial institutions “by enacting rules restricting private
accumulations of power by financial institutions”).
302. Notably, capping the amount that an asset manager could hold in any one industry or
corporation could achieve similar effects: fund families would be prevented from holding huge
stakes in competing businesses. Such a scheme would preclude common owners within industries,
as well as across the entire market. This proposal has most prominently been championed by
Professors Eric Posner, Fiona Morgan, and Glen Weyl. See generally Eric A. Posner, Fiona M.
Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal To Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional
Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2017) (proposing enforcement policy for institutional
investors). Under their proposal, asset managers could hold at most 1 percent of the shares in any
given industry or one company in each industry. Id. at 678. However, capping the amount that
institutions could hold in any one corporation or industry would be more disruptive than a global
cap. For a review of the transaction costs on both the regulatory and the corporate ends of such a
proposal, see Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 264, at 44–47. While Lambert and Sykuta’s concerns
that curtailing the influence of institutional investors would increase agency costs is addressed
later, see id. at 49–50; infra Part IV.E, they also outline the extensive regulation that would go
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Indeed, the effect of AUM’s size is vividly illustrated in Azar et
al.’s event study mentioned above.303 After the acquisition of Barclays
Global Investors by BlackRock in 2009—which made BlackRock the
world’s biggest asset manager—affected markets experienced postacquisition decreases in annual wages per employee and employmentto-population.
B. The Impact of Breakup on Common Ownership
The monopsony effect arises not because common owners are
diversified but because they can impose their governance agenda on
essentially the entire market, impacting the balance of strong- and
weak-governance companies.304 A larger group of smaller investors
would not have the power to assert similar dominance over the
corporate sector. Particularly, smaller asset managers operating under
an asset cap could not generate a monopsony effect for at least two
reasons: (1) directors would be free to act independently without
worrying about the “800-pound gorilla” of institutional-investor voice,
and (2) activist investors would face greater transaction costs in
pushing for strong governance.
1. The 800-Pound Gorilla. Controlling shareholders have been
colorfully described as an 800-pound gorilla—their will may be ignored
only at one’s peril.305 Although the Big Three institutional investors
rarely exert outright control, together they are the largest shareholder
in almost 90 percent of the S&P 500.306 Breaking up the largest asset
managers would go a long way toward sidelining the stock markets’
King Kong,307 allowing directors to exercise greater independence in
investing and hiring.

into a proposal like that of Posner and coauthors. See generally Posner et al., supra. Of course,
with increased regulation comes increased compliance costs.
303. See supra notes 194–196 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part III.D.
305. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 509 (2002) (describing the controlling shareholder as “an
800-pound gorilla [that] wants the rest of the bananas”).
306. See Fichtner et al., supra note 16.
307. See Kara Haar, King Kong Through the Years: How the Giant Gorilla Has Evolved Since
1933, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 9, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/lists/kingkong-years-how-giant-gorilla-has-evolved-1933-982360/item/king-kong-1933-983416 [https://per
ma.cc/PN9L-HBYB] (explaining that King Kong is a gargantuan gorilla who has wreaked
cinematic havoc for nearly nine decades).
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For example, a director would be unlikely to defy BlackRock
without fear of reprisal. That same director might also serve as a
director308 or executive309 at another firm where BlackRock holds a
large stake. Now, multiply that effect threefold if all the Big Three
oppose a move. Directors with career and reputation concerns cannot
risk their relationship with the Big Three or other major asset
managers because these same key investors wield influence throughout
the corporate sector.310 Disappointing a controlling shareholder may
lead to dismissal from a single board, but a run-in with a giant
institutional investor could have more far-reaching consequences.311 A
smaller asset manager does not create the same career and reputation
risks.312 Accordingly, breaking up the largest institutional investors
would allay director concerns and allow them to act independently and
according to their best judgment, without significant fear of reprisal.
2. Increased Transaction Costs for Proxy Fights. Increasing the
number of asset managers would also make it more difficult for activist
investors to build the coalitions necessary to wage proxy campaigns,
limiting one of the central tools common owners use to restrict
managerial freedom. Instead of working with the same few repeat
players in every proxy fight, activists would have to engage many more

308. In 2019, most S&P 500 independent directors sat on more than one board, with 31
percent sitting on three or more. SPENCER STUART, 2019 U.S. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX
17, https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2019/ssbi-2019/us_board_index_2019.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/B7W2-QV8N].
309. A large proportion (41 percent) of CEOs sit on boards outside their own companies. Id.
at 22.
310. This argument is a variation of the same argument that applies to managers. See supra
Part II.A.1. Of course, if directors had no career or reputational concern, this would be a nonissue.
311. See Gordon, supra note 101, at 1488 (arguing that directorial independence is limited by
the career concerns of directors); see also Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of
Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 971, 983 n.60 (2019) (noting that directors’ career concerns
are magnified because “they are likely to meet the same money managers at other public
companies”).
312. For instance, industry leaders devote time to decoding BlackRock CEO and
Chairperson Larry Fink’s famous annual letter. See, e.g., Larry Fink, The Power of Capitalism,
BLACKROCK (2022), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceoletter [https://perma.cc/R3Y6-AZ8R]; Dan Pontefract, Decoding BlackRock Chairman Larry
Fink’s Letter to CEOs on the Importance of Purpose, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2019, 7:29 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/danpontefract/2019/01/26/decoding-blackrock-chairman-larry-finks-letterto-ceos-on-the-importance-of-purpose/#749bf2aa2995 [https://perma.cc/H4W3-XC9C]. There would
be no great need to decode, analyze, and ultimately act on the annual letter of an asset manager
one-fifteenth the size.
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shareholders313 and win over a much larger cadre of investors.314 A
larger number of investors presents not only a challenge in terms of
time, energy, and communication costs but also a strategic difficulty in
forming a coalition.315 The larger the number of asset managers, the
greater the possible divergence of opinions among them as to both the
appropriate governance structure and the quality of investments
undertaken by managers.316 A larger number of investors with differing
opinions would also allow managers to counteract activists by
persuading a substantial number of shareholders to support
management over the activist.317 Consequently, even in corporations
with strong governance, the probability of mistakenly firing loyal
managers would decrease.318
These effects explain why a smaller asset manager lacks the means
and incentive to influence corporate governance in the same way that
megamanagers such as BlackRock and Vanguard do. The sum of a
smaller set of large voices is greater than the sum of a larger set of small
ones. In short, following a breakup, common owners would no longer

313. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage,
Thwarted Majorities, and the Public Morality (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
373/2017, 2017), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3058&context
=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/TA4X-5NQX] (outlining the relationship between activist
hedge funds and “permanent shareholders”—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street).
314. See John Armour & Brian Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by
Hedge Funds 8–9 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 136/2009, 2009), https://
ssrn.com/abstract_id=1489336 [https://perma.cc/ER7V-NYXQ] (describing the “various types of
transaction costs” that arise from an activist bid, including “communication costs,” or the costs of
communicating with shareholders).
315. See Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 300 (“In short, concentration increases the likelihood
that actors will share interests and decreases the costs of organizing to advocate for their
agenda.”).
316. See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism
in Corporate Governance, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1015, 1018–19 (observing that widespread
shareholder activism is possible only because the rise of institutional investors have reduced
collective action problems in assembling a winning coalition); A.N. Licht, Corporate Governance,
in HANDBOOK OF KEY GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE
369, 375 (Gerard Caprio ed., 2012) (noting that in dispersed-ownership firms, “[m]ounting a proxy
fight to promote a proposal not sponsored by the board is a cumbersome, expensive exercise that
may be reserved for special occasions”).
317. DELOITTE, ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS: HOW WILL YOU RESPOND? 3 (2015), https://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance/wallace-cfo-insight-activist-sha
reholder.pdf [https://perma.cc/846X-KFYY] (encouraging management to fend off activists by
“proactively engaging with investors,” and especially with “major shareholders, who can be
cornerstones of an activist defense”).
318. So, too, will the probability of correctly firing disloyal managers.
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have the ability to impact corporate governance to the extent of
creating a monopsony effect.
C. Restricting Proxy Advisers’ Advice on Corporate Governance
To reinforce the effects of breaking up powerful institutional
investors, the coordination between institutional investors through
proxy advisers should be prevented. Institutional investors discharge
their duty to vote if they vote according to a predetermined policy and
based on the recommendations of an independent third party—a proxy
advisory firm.319 Indeed, many institutional investors have outsourced
their voting responsibilities to proxy advisory firms—especially the two
leading firms, Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass, Lewis &
Co., with a combined market share of 97 percent.320 Consequently,
proxy advisors have an enormous influence on share voting at publicly
traded corporations in the United States,321 and they are often
perceived as “de facto corporate governance regulators.”322
Although proxy advisers provide economies of scale and scope in
voting, their brand of one-size-fits-all voting has contributed to the
labor monopsony. Most notably, proxy advisers’ corporate governance
policies universally favor strong governance.323 Given the externality
that such policies impose on employees, regulators should prohibit
proxy advisers from making recommendations on corporate
governance issues. To be sure, this would hamper the economies of
scale in voting that proxy advisers foster. But the burden on
institutional investors to research governance proposals for themselves
is justified by the need to break the lockstep toward strong governance
that has hamstrung labor markets. Proxy advisers act as the ringmasters
of a cartelized labor market; sidelining them would make cartel-like
behavior harder to perpetrate.

319. Asaf Eckstein, Great Expectations: The Peril of an Expectations Gap in Proxy Advisory
Firm Regulation, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 92–93 (2015).
320. Id. at 93–94.
321. Asaf Eckstein & Sharon Hannes, A Long/Short Incentive Scheme for Proxy Advisory
Firms, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 787, 789 (2018) (describing the influence of Institutional
Shareholder Services and Glass, Lewis & Co. in the United States).
322. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 6
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-129.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTE7EQJC].
323. See Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 2563, 2596 (2021) (describing proxy advisors’ voting recommendations).

GOSHEN AND LEVIT PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

66

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/21/2022 1:26 PM

[Vol. 72:1

D. The Monopsony Model Revisited
The monopsony model above demonstrates how common owners
push the corporate governance balance away from its equilibrium,
resulting in a disproportionate number of strong-governance firms.324
After a mandated breakup, common owners would no longer have the
same power to influence governance decisions en masse. Their ability
to create a monopsony effect would be impaired or disrupted
altogether. Thus, after a mandated breakup, investments would rise,
stimulating hiring and pushing labor prices back to equilibrium.
Consider again the model introduced above, where, due to the
influence of common owners, wages are $20,000 below equilibrium
(employees earn $80,000 a year).325 From an equilibrium of fifty-fifty
strong- and weak-governance firms, common owners have created a
market of seventy strong-governance firms and thirty weakgovernance firms. Moreover, common owners oppose any attempt to
move corporations back toward weak governance, resulting in higher
returns to their portfolios due to below-market wages.326
Now, however, suppose a mandated breakup has sidelined those
common owners. Individual firms are once again free to make
governance decisions that maximize their profits. To benefit from the
$20,000 additional profit from each employee hired, some stronggovernance firms will switch to weak governance, incentivizing
managers to invest and hire workers and generate abnormal returns.327
As more and more firms switch to weak governance, wages will rise
until they equal the marginal revenue of each new hire.328 That is,
wages will climb back to $100,000. Moreover, as productivity increases
over time, so too will wages, eliminating the monopsony effect in the
long run.
A mandated breakup would disrupt the central mechanism of the
monopsony effect. Capping AUM would restore competition to the
labor market and balance to the aggregate corporate governance.

324. See supra Part III.D.
325. See supra Part III.D.
326. See supra notes 254–256 and accompanying text.
327. See supra Part III.B.
328. Under classical economic competitive conditions, wages are said to track productivity.
Roy J. Rotheim, Keynes and the Marginalist Theory of Distribution, 20 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON.
355, 356–57 (1998) (describing the “orthodox theory of distribution where factors of production
receive unique rewards equal to the value of their respective marginal products”).
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Thus, breaking up large asset managers is a significant step
policymakers could take to eliminate the monopsony effect and return
wages to their competitive levels.
E. Breakup, Agency Costs, and Inequality
The breakup proposal goes against the view of agency-costs
essentialists that strong governance is an unmitigated good.329 This
Article advocates for breaking up asset managers for precisely the
reasons that other scholars have lauded their interventions. To take
one example, scholars have praised institutional investors supporting
activist hedge funds’ campaigns to implement cost-saving and
shareholder-empowering measures.330 Meanwhile, this Article views
the “one-two punch” of common owners and activists as a threat to
competitive labor markets, as it leaves directors and managers less
willing to invest in hiring workers.
The key to allaying these concerns is the understanding that while
agents introduce costs, so too do principals. Empowering agents
increases agent costs while empowering principals increases principal
costs.331 For the past several decades, scholars have focused on how to
ameliorate agent costs by empowering principals—that is, how to
police corporate malfeasance by empowering shareholders to hold
disloyal managers accountable.332 This Article argues that the fight
against agent costs has neglected to consider the principal costs it
inflicts in the form of a labor market monopsony.
To be sure, a return to a world with more dispersed ownership
would mean greater management agency costs. If activist investors are
hamstrung in their ability to wage proxy fights against disloyal
managers, for example, more inefficient investments would follow.
329. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 23, at 775 (describing agency-cost essentialism as the
belief that “the reduction of agency costs is the essential role of corporate law and of related fields
such as securities regulation”).
330. For example, Professors Gilson and Gordon describe activist investors as “governance
arbitrageurs” who work alongside institutional investors in the service of “maximizing
performance.” Gilson & Gordon, supra note 41, at 896–97.
331. Goshen & Squire, supra note 23, at 771 (“Principal costs and agent costs are substitutes
for each other: Any reallocation of control rights between investors and managers decreases one
type of cost but increases the other.”).
332. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate Law?, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 2
(Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard
Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda & Edward Rock eds., 2d ed. 2009).
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However, there would also be fewer downsizings,333 fewer mass
layoffs,334 and fewer managers mistakenly fired for being disloyal.335 In
the aggregate, both loyal and disloyal managers would be freer to
invest. Indeed, shareholders would suffer a loss from more inefficient
investments by disloyal managers, but shareholders would only be
losing the value previously taken from employees.336 The result would
not be a windfall to employees but rather a return to a more efficient
and equitable balance between labor and capital.337
In short, agent costs have fallen too much, and principal costs have
increased too much. In a competitive equilibrium, investors bear some
efficient level of inefficient investments due to agent costs.338 Under the
present equilibrium, those agent costs are too low, coming at the
expense of lower wages. The claim that muffling institutional voices
would increase management agency costs is correct, but it misses the
point. Indeed, smaller asset managers would be less able to promote
shareholders’ interest in minimizing agent costs. But other interests—
particularly those of employees—would be better served, as would the
interests of the market as a whole.
CONCLUSION
In addition to explaining macroeconomic trends such as wage
stagnation and growing income inequality, the monopsony effect of
common ownership challenges the conventional wisdom in corporate
law scholarship that strong governance is a net economic good. This
Article identified the long-suspected—but until now, elusive—
anticompetitive implications of common ownership and strong
governance. While strong governance reduces management agency
costs, it simultaneously discourages investment and hiring. Common
ownership brings about a new and less efficient equilibrium, with

333. See Lazonick, supra note 161 (arguing that the new mantra of activist hedge funds has
become “downsize-and-distribute” (emphasis omitted)).
334. See Brav et al., supra note 212, at 2764 (finding that employees at target firms experience
stagnating hours and wages); Mariah Summers, Employees Often End Up the Losers in Activist
Investing Campaigns, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 21, 2014, 12:05 PM), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mariahsummers/employees-often-end-up-the-losers-in-activistinvesting-camp [https://perma.cc/8ML4-4S8B].
335. See supra notes 163–165 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 246–248 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Part III.C (arguing that the competitive distribution of wealth between labor
and capital maximizes social welfare).
338. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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higher corporate profits, lower wages, and increased income
inequality. The inherent tradeoff of strong governance suggests that
policymakers must choose between siding with shareholders or
employees. If they choose employees, policymakers should consider
breaking up common owners, thereby restoring wages to their
competitive equilibrium.

